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DAVID MARKELL*

“Slack” in the Administrative State
and its Implications for
Governance: The Issue
of Accountability.1
* Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
Michael Asimow, Mary Blakeslee, Joel Blumstein, Linda Breggin, Cary Coglianese,
Robert Glicksman, Ron Levin, Shelley Metzenbaum, Greg Mitchell, Joel Mintz,
Cliff Rechtschaffen, J.B. Ruhl, Mark Seidenfeld, Sidney Shapiro, and Mike
Vandenbergh kindly reviewed drafts of this article. Sarah Lindquist, Florida State
University Law, Class of 2006, provided very capable research assistance.
1 For use of the term “slack” in discussing agency discretion in the administrative
state, see, for example, Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 101-02 (1998) (characterizing as “high
slack” an administrative regime that “shroud[ed] regulators from public scrutiny”
and suggesting that “slack” makes special-interest regulation possible because it
allows regulatory decision-makers to operate in a “shadow of secrecy”); Michael E.
Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 174, 179 (1990) (describing
“slack” as “allow[ing] a regulator to function without being perfectly observed by
the polity”). For elaboration of the concepts of “accountability” and transparency,
see, for example, Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and
[1]
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T

he appropriate structure of the administrative state has been
a topic of rich debate for decades.2 There are those who are
concerned, on the one hand, about “unchecked administrative
power”3—that is, about agencies having too much “slack” in implementing their programmatic responsibilities.4 On the other
hand, concerns have been raised that agencies’ capacity to fulfill
their missions has been compromised because of internal constraints,5 and/or because of overly zealous external oversight, including “excessive judicial intervention in executive branch
activities.”6
Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 508-26 (2002);
ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2001).
2 For a recent overview, see Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2003). For a few other articles in the
vast literature concerning this issue, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1040-44 (1997); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1995); Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689 (2000);
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 104-05, 121-23 (2001); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) [hereinafter
Reformation].
3 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative
Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990). The fact that agencies exercise legislative, executive, and judicial powers highlights this concern. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch
Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 181 n.122 (1996).
4 Croley, supra note 1, at 12. As Levine and Forrence note, “slack” in governance
may produce a range of agency behaviors. Some may serve the public interest while
others may not. Levine & Forrence, supra note 1, at 185.
5 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like – Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? , 41
DUKE L.J. 1311, 1317-18 (1992); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and
Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety , 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 315 (1987);
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process , 41
DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533 (2000) (counting 111 steps in
the rulemaking process).
6 Levin, supra note 3, at 692. Views about the appropriateness of judicial review
of agency actions relate both to the intensity of judicial review as well as to whether
there should be judicial review at all. Id. at 690. For discussions of the contributions
of judicial review and of its downsides, see, for example, ROSS SANDLER & DAVID
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE (Yale Univ. Press 2003); Levin, supra note
3, at 693-702; Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 654-55, 683 (1985) (noting that, inter alia, “[i]n the modern
era, the judicial role is to ensure the identification and implementation of statutory
values and to guard against factional power over the regulatory process”). For discussions of the mechanisms that Congress has available to influence agency action
and the principal-agent problems that Congress faces, see, for example, E. Donald
Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the
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There have been ebbs and flows in the shape of governance
over the years as views have evolved over how best to strike the
proper balance in terms of agency autonomy. In his 1975 article,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law ,7 Professor
Richard Stewart describes an ongoing “transformation” of administrative law that featured increased accountability of government for its actions.8 Professor Sid Shapiro has suggested that
the leaders of Stewart’s “reformation” were “civic skeptics,” individuals who were not inclined to put their faith in “bureaucratic
elites.”9 These leaders identified “the ‘capture’ of government
by the business community as the cause”10 of a variety of societal
ills, including environmental pollution. Their fixes included revamping agency practice to increase the public’s opportunities to
participate in agency decision-making and increasing opportunities for the public to challenge agency practices in court.11
Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 150-60 (discussing various mechanisms for
legislative control of agencies, including the legislative veto). For assessments of
presidential power to influence the course of agency action through appointment
power and otherwise, see, for example, Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate Over
Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 219 (listing “threat of removal,” “appointments,” “budgetary control,” and “the promise of
higher office” among the President’s powers to influence agency action); cf.
Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 181 n.122 (suggesting that “in the context of the huge
modern executive branch, in which only the President is elected, the extent to which
the agencies are actually politically answerable is quite limited”).
7 Reformation, supra note 2.
8 See id. at 1669, 1715-60 (suggesting that the “expansion of standing to seek judicial review,” and “the extension of non-constitutional rights to participate in agency
proceedings,” among other doctrinal developments, leads to better “consideration of
the interests of all affected persons,” and better results for society as a whole).
Thomas W. Merrill has suggested that between 1967 and 1983 there was “expanded
judicial oversight and control of agency action . . . [and] a general shift in authority
over regulatory policy from agencies to courts.” Merrill, supra note 2, at 1040. And,
that while there have been some retrenchments in judicial authority since 1983, most
of the innovations spawned during that period have endured. Id. at 1040-44.
9 Shapiro, supra note 2, at 696 (quoting MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORMATION SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 44 (Cornell
Univ. Press 1986)).
10 Id. at 697; see also Reformation, supra note 2, at 1713.
11 Shapiro explains, “[t]o ensure the effectiveness of federal regulation,” proponents of reform advocated the use of administrative procedures—“particularly the
impact statement, ‘hard look’ review, and standing—which enabled regulatory beneficiaries to challenge the failure of agencies to regulate sufficiently.” Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 736-37. Professor Shapiro offers the following concise summary of Stewart’s view of the character of the reformation:
Stewart’s [reformation] referred to various developments that had the cumulative impact of empowering the beneficiaries of regulation, or more
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Professor Shapiro noted that the reformation, too, had its
skeptics and engendered what he has termed a “counter-reformation,”12 which, among other things, sought to reduce citizen
participation in governance.13 Professor Shapiro characterized
the story of the counter-reformation as “see[ing] irrational and
counterproductive regulation as the problem, the ‘capture’ of
government by regulatory beneficiaries as the cause, and the reduction of the influence of such groups as the solution.”14 Shapiro noted the counter-reformation view that there was an “iron
triangle”15 of interests that were biased against a free commercial
society and markets that had captured government.16 This triangle did not “represent the will of the people, but only the narrow,
parochial interests of the New Class.”17
This Article explores the ongoing evolution of central features
of the regulatory state by examining important “details of agency
behavior”18 in the field of environmental regulation. My thesis is
that while there are numerous signals that our system of governance is becoming increasingly open and transparent,19 important
features of the administrative state have the potential to slow
often, their representatives, public interest groups, to exercise the same
participatory rights in regulatory decisionmaking as regulated entities. At
the time, this transformation was revolutionary. While those whose private
property was adversely affected by governmental action have always had
participatory rights, the beneficiaries of regulation historically did not have
the same opportunities to influence regulatory decisionmaking or to sue
agencies when regulations were not to their liking.
Id. at 692.
12 Id. at 689.
13 Id. at 697.
14 Id. For a more in-depth explanation of “the cause,” see id. at 703.
15 Professor Shapiro suggests that the “iron triangle” included the press, agencies,
and judiciary. Id. at 704.
16 Id. at 704-05 (citing Paul H. Weaver, Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict, 50 PUB. INT. L. Rep. 45, 52 (1978)). Shapiro notes that there are a variety of
versions of the story that regulatory beneficiaries have captured regulatory policy.
Id. at 705 (listing and explaining the versions of Bruce Ackerman, William Hassler,
Cass Sunstein, and Justice Stephen Breyer).
17 Id. at 704-05. The counter-reformationists, in Professor Shapiro’s view, used
three tools that were also key elements of reformation, id. at 689, to “combat ‘government failure,’” id. at 707. The reformationists: (1) required the agencies to produce “impact statements” to investigate the effects of regulations prior to their
implementation; (2) encouraged the judiciary to use “‘hard look’ review,” in which
judges closely scrutinize an agency’s decision to ensure that it is rational; and (3)
used strict application of standing to limit the regulatory beneficiaries’ access to the
Court. Id. at 707-20.
18 Croley, supra note 1, at 7.
19 Part II, infra.
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such trends, and even to shift our regulatory apparatus in the
opposite direction, toward reduced openness and accountability
and diminished leverage or influence for interested citizens.20
20 This Article may have value for theoreticians since proof of these theories (or
lack thereof) can and should be found, at least in part, in the reality of the operation
of the administrative state. Complementing the assessments summarized in the text
concerning the evolution of the administrative state are a variety of theories about
its operation—about what the administrative state does and should do and how it
should be structured.

In his synthesis of the scholarship on regulatory governance, Professor Steven Croley identifies four significant schools of thought: public choice theory, neopluralist
theory, public interest theory, and civic republican theory. In capsule form, public
choice advocates believe that agencies provide “regulatory benefits to well organized political interest groups . . . at the expense of the general, unorganized public.”
Croley, supra note 1, at 5. Neopluralists assert that regulation is the result of “many
interest groups with opposing interests compet[ing] for favorable regulation.” Id.
In their vision of the regulatory world, this competition is far less “lopsided” than
under public choice theory. Public interest theorists concentrate on the general public’s “ability to monitor regulatory decisionmakers.” Id. Proponents claim that regulatory outcomes “tend to reflect general interest” when there is significant public
scrutiny of agency actions, while such outcomes tend to “deliver regulatory benefits
to well organized interest groups at the public’s expense” when oversight is lacking.
Id. Civic republicans believe that deliberation is a key feature of effective governance and that, accordingly, regulation works well when it facilitates collective deliberation about “means and ends.” Id. Croley acknowledges that his synthesis
oversimplifies the terrain in a variety of ways. Id. at 4 n.6. He suggests that “while
more than a difference of vocabulary distinguishes them, at times it is possible to
interpret each theory in ways that renders it much like its counterparts.” Id. at 1112. Furthermore, the theories “do not always yield crisp, readily testable predictions” and “it is not immediately clear to what extent the different theories are complementary, compatible, or exclusive.” Id. at 5.
Others have emphasized the difficulty of understanding these theories as well. See,
e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 801, 805-10, 865 (1993) (noting that “it is difficult to define the doctrine [of
civic republicanism]” and that “[t]he amorphous nature of modern civic republicanism forces non-adherents to resort to deduction and speculation to fill in the gaps
regarding the theory’s implications in the real world,” and that “[u]nfortunately,
since political theory concerns itself almost exclusively with conceptions of rights,
institutions, and groups, this disclaimer indicates that not much has been resolved by
modern civic republican theory. This is hard on those of us who are not yet sold on
the theory.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1576 (1988) (noting that “[l]arge questions—having to do with the appropriate conception of rights, institutions, and groups—remain to be resolved.”).
Implicit in each theory is a vision of the administrative state—about how the administrative state should and does operate. Thus, public choice proponents would expect the administrative state to feature “procedural mechanisms [that] facilitat[e]
[well-organized] groups’ ability to influence decisionmakers” but that do not “encourage widespread participation . . . .” Croley, supra note 1, at 97. Neopluralists
would anticipate that administrative decision-making typically is “carried out
through processes accessible to many parties . . . .” Id. at 100. Public interest theoreticians would expect a little bit of both: In some cases widespread participation
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Part I of this Article describes what many believe to be a trend
in our administrative state in the direction of greater openness
and accountability. This Part reviews what some might characterize as the apparently evolving mores of the times and discusses
actual changes in the nature of the administrative state that appear to portend a more transparent and inclusive state than ever
before. My guess is that this Part reflects the views that many
today hold about the overall direction of our administrative state
in terms of the issues of openness and transparency.21
Part II provides a different picture of the operation of the administrative state than one might draw from the types of developments described in Part I.22 This Part digs deeper into critical
aspects of the actual operation of the administrative state. The
picture this more in-depth perspective provides is one of a state
that may be moving in the direction of less openness, transparency, and accountability, rather than more, or at least a state
in which accountability and transparency may potentially be reduced because of the seemingly fundamental features of the regulatory state discussed in Part II.23
Part III concludes by reviewing the implications of these signals about the shape and direction of governance. This Part suggests that, at a minimum, there is a need to grapple with the
underlying infrastructure of environmental law implementation
in order to understand which way the state is going, and whether
will occur, and will thereby “reduce the slack that so often makes special-interest
regulation possible,” id. at 102, while in other circumstances special-interest regulation will occur because such widespread participation is lacking. Civic republican
theorists would hope that administrative processes “provide real opportunities for
participation by many groups” since in their view regulatory decision-making should
provide an opportunity for “public-spirited dialogue and deliberation about regulatory priorities.” Id. at 96-104. Professor Croley, suggesting that theorists pay relatively little attention to how regulation works, calls for “more careful attention than
existing theories have given to the actual administrative channels through which particular regulatory policies take shape,” asserting that “[s]uch attention helps to remedy the weaknesses of theories of regulation that abstract from administrative
reality, and paves the way for further assessment and refinement of them.” Id. at 7.
21 See infra Part II and sources cited therein, and infra note 41. But this view is
by no means unchallenged. See infra note 40.
22 What I am suggesting in Part II is that the narrative about the administrative
state reviewed in Part I may not be taking adequately into account important elements of real world administrative law and practice. Part II effectively proposes a
counter-narrative or refined narrative that highlights what seem to be potential gaps
in the traditional story.
23 See infra Part II.
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“Slack” in the Administrative State

fine-tuning of the regulatory state, or perhaps a more dramatic
shift in course and structure, is warranted.
I
APPARENT TRENDS TOWARDS GREATER OPENNESS
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
While forecasting the future is obviously a risky enterprise,
there are several reasons why one might expect the future administrative state to evolve in the direction of increasing openness or
transparency. First, there is the argument that, as Lester
Salamon suggests in his 2002 book, The Tools of Government: A
Guide to the New Governance ,24 the structure of government has
changed dramatically in recent years. Professor Salamon asserts
that there has been a “fundamental transformation not just in the
scope and scale of government action, but in its basic forms.”25
Professor Salamon contends that “the defining characteristics
of many of the most widely used, and most rapidly expanding,
tools [of governance] is their indirect character, their establishment of interdependencies between public agencies and a host of
third-party actors.”26 He further suggests that as a result, “gov24 THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M.
Salamon ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT].
25 Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 24. The debate about
“new governance” in the environmental field has encompassed discussion of appropriate endpoints for environmental protection efforts and of the mix of tools that
should be used to achieve desired goals. For a few of the contributions to the extensive literature on these questions, see Symposium, Second Generation Environmental Policy and the Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Jan Mazurek, Back to the
Future: How to Put Environmental Modernization Back on Track 6, PROGRESSIVE
POLICY INSTITUTE POLICY REPORT (April 2003) (urging moving to a Second Generation of strategies for environmental protection and calling for the development of
an “Alternative Path” to the present system). Shelley H. Metzenbaum’s succinct
summary of this work is as follows:
Over the past decade, numerous environmental, business, government, and
community leaders have come together in multiple settings to explore ways
to improve the environment and the existing environmental protection system. A common theme emanating from these groups is that the existing
system needs to be more performance-focused, information-driven, flexible
in the means of meeting standards, strictly accountable, and open and
transparent (NAPA 1995; NAPA 1997; E4E 1998).
Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Information, Environmental Performance, and Environmental Management Systems, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 146, 147-48 (Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., Resources for the Future 2001).
26 Salamon, supra note 25, at 11; see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Pub-
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ernment gains important allies but loses the ability to exert complete control over the operation of its own
programs.”27
Overall, this change in government’s character and in the structure of governance seemingly portends increased government
openness and accountability, at least to the extent that this shift
involves more than new forms of regulator/regulated party partnerships and results in the inclusion of the “beneficiaries” of
government.28
Second, dramatic developments in the world of technology operate to facilitate government openness and opportunities for
civic engagement. The revolution in technology in recent years,
including the invention of the Internet and accompanying hardware developments, partially accounts for this phenomenon. For
example, the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program,29 enacted
in 1986, dramatically enhanced citizens’ ability to understand the
volumes of pollutants being released into the environment by
providing this information in one accessible location. The notion
of consolidating pollutant release information in one place was
quite creative, but its value was increased enormously by technological developments that facilitated transmission of and access
to such information. As Michael Gerrard and Michael Herz
have written, the TRI “was a good idea that became a great one
because of the perfectly timed development of the ideal tool for
dissemination of TRI data: [T]he World Wide Web.”30
lic Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 552, 592 (2000) (suggesting that in the new
administrative state “public and private actors share responsibility for governance”).
27 Salamon, supra note 25, at 1.
28 “Beneficiaries” of regulation include members of the public, typically represented by public interest groups, whose “private property [is not] adversely affected
by governmental action” but who nonetheless benefit from agency regulation. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 692; see also Stewart, supra note 2, at 1682-83. In contrast,
some forms of “interdependent” government have considerable potential to reduce
government openness and accountability. Freeman, supra note 26, at 647.
29 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000).
30 Michael B. Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology to
Improve the Environmental Impact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 18, 19 n.5
(2003); see also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899
(codified in scattered sections of 44 U.S.C.); Mark S. Winfield, North American Pollutant Release and Transfer Registries: A Case Study in Environmental Policy Convergence, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 38, 39 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds.,
Stanford Law and Politics 2003) (noting that the full potential of pollutant release
and transfer registries (PRTRs) has “only come to be recognized in the past five
years, in large part due to the emergence of the technical capacity in personal computers and the World Wide Web to support the collection, provision of access to, and
analysis of PRTR data sets”). E-rulemaking is another example of the use of tech-
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Third, interest in increasing transparency and public participation in governance appears to be burgeoning. Consistent with
Professor Salamon’s characterization of the “new governance,”
there has been considerable emphasis in recent years on enhancing opportunities for citizen participation in environmental governance.31 This is true throughout the world.32 Carl Bruch and
Meg Filbey suggest that the 1992 Rio Declaration’s Principle 10,
which provides that “[e]nvironmental issues are best handled
with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant
level” and that “[s]tates shall facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation by making information widely available,”33 “crystallize[s] the emerging norms of public involvement.”34 Bruch and Filbey suggest that Principle 10 has served as
nology to increase government openness. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking:
Information Technology and the Regulatory Process , 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 355
(2004).
31 See, e.g., MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF
TECHNOPOPULISM (Governance Inst./Brookings Inst. Press 2002); Ira Feldman, The
Stakeholder Convergence: Enhanced Public Participation and Sustainable Business
Practices, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,496 (2003). For earlier expressions of commitment
to fostering citizen involvement, see, for example, Clean Water Act § 101(e), 33
U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2000) (providing that “[p]ublic participation in the development,
revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard . . . or program established . . .
under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the [EPA] Administrator and the States.”); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d
Cir. 1976) (stating that “[I]n enacting § 304 of the 1970 Amendments, Congress
made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers
but rather as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests.”).
32 See generally, THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 220-24 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000); Carl E. Bruch & Roman Czebiniak, Globalizing Environmental Governance: Making the Leap From Regional Initiatives on
Transparency, Participation, and Accountability in Environmental Matters , 32
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,428 (2002); INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, FOUR-YEAR REVIEW OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
17-18 (1998), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree
(noting a “trend toward increased citizen involvement in international mechanisms”). The Aarhus Convention is a prominent example of the increasing emphasis
on public participation. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (June 25,
1998), available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf; cf. Steve
Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance , 18
MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 268 (1997) (considering whether NGO involvement is “cyclical” but concluding that “NGOs seem poised to strengthen their influence in the
foreseeable future”).
33 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 10, June 14, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 874.
34 Carl Bruch & Meg Filbey, Emerging Global Norms of Public Involvement, in
THE NEW “PUBLIC”: THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 1, 3 (Envtl.
L. Inst. 2002). John Wirth similarly suggested that the Rio Declaration played a key
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an anchor that has helped to spawn numerous regional initiatives
to increase transparency and public involvement.35 Proponents
of increases in transparency and citizen participation in environmental or other aspects of governance internationally have invoked reasons similar to those offered by proponents of similar
developments domestically, including increasing the fairness of
the workings of international regimes;36 improving the information available to international decision-makers;37 enhancing prospects for compliance;38 and strengthening the legitimacy of the
institutions involved.39
The tide of interest in increasing transparency and public involvement in governance, including environmental governance,
has clearly swept through the United States.40 Professor Jim
role in galvanizing citizens interested in increasing public involvement in governance. John D. Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee , in
GREENING NAFTA, supra note 30, at 199-200 (quoting Kathleen Rogers of
Audobon as stating that “In Rio, we all caught on at the same time that civil society
was emerging, [manifested] in civil participation . . . .”).
35 Bruch & Filbey, supra note 34, at 3-5 (listing, for example, eight such regional
initiatives that have embraced a variation of Principle 10).
36 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
479-81, 484 (1995) (noting that, for example, “as more power has flowed to the
anonymous bureaucratic and diplomatic institutions of international organizations,
so the clamor of individuals for meaningful participation in the decisions affecting
their lives has increased” and that the “characteristic of the predominant modality in
the organization of global discourse that voice and vote are reserved exclusively for
governments . . . is both manifestly unfair and, ultimately, destructive of discourse”).
37 Kenneth W. Abbott, The Decline of the Nation State and Its Effects on Constitutional and International Economic Law Contribution: “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism , 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 971, 1006 (1996) (noting that, for example, “NGOs can be valuable sources
of information”).
38 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 331-34 (1997).
39 Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 597-98
(1999) (noting, for example, that some environmentalists have “deplored the ‘democratic deficit’ in international institutions resulting from a lack of public
participation”).
40 There are significant currents moving in the direction of restricting access to
various types of information, particularly concerns relating to national security. See,
e.g., Center for Progressive Reform, Secrecy in Government: “Democracy Dies Behind Closed Doors,” at www.progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/secrecy.cfm (accessed July 25, 2005) (arguing that, particularly post September 11, 2001, the Bush
Administration and Congress have taken numerous steps to encourage government
secrecy); Data on Chemical, Drinking Water Security Protected Under Homeland Security Rule, Nat’l Env’t Daily (BNA) No. 34, Feb. 23, 2004, at A-1; Michael Fitzpatrick, Code Orange: Will It Be Used to “End-Run” Federal Rulemaking
Requirements?, 29 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 11 (Spring 2004) (suggesting that a
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Rossi, for example, suggests that “[o]ver the last thirty years or
so, courts, Congress, and scholars have elevated participation to
a sacrosanct status”41 and he notes that “recent reform efforts
are consistently geared to enhance broad-based participation in
the agency decisionmaking process.”42
Fourth, there have been numerous changes in law and policy
that are intended to enhance transparency in governance and the
public’s opportunity to have input into public policy. In the
rulemaking arena in particular,43 the track record of governance,
by and large,44 is a prominent example of expanding opportunities for citizens to engage their governments.45 Such opportunivariety of laws passed in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
“implicate important and sensitive policy issues,” including the availability of information to the public); Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, The Freedom of Information Act Post9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and
Homeland Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2003) (“[O]ne must examine
whether our government’s high degree of transparency, though serving a valuable
social purpose, may also provide support to terrorists.”).
41 Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (1997) (citations
omitted).
42 Id. at 175. For a recent example, see Executive Order “Facilitation of Cooperative Conservation,” issued by President George W. Bush on August 26, 2004, stating
in section one that its emphasis is “on appropriate inclusion of local participation in
Federal decisionmaking.” Exec. Order. No. 13,352, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26,
2004).
43 U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON. & INNOVATION, ENGAGING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: A REVIEW OF EPA’S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION POLICY AND REGULATIONS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 8-9 (2000), available at http://www.
epa.gov/publicinvolvement/pdf/eap_report.pdf [hereinafter 2000 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION POLICY REVIEW] (containing summaries of various statutes and Executive Orders that influence public participation in rulemaking). The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) establishes detailed procedures that are intended to promote
transparency and accountability for agencies to use in performing their rulemaking
function. These include “notice and comment” procedures and opportunities for
judicial review of regulations. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c), 701 (2000). For a helpful summary of issues that have percolated through the courts concerning these procedures
and opportunities and that have received the Executive Branch’s attention, see
MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 235-45
(West Group 2d ed. 1998).
44 See supra note 40.
45 Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 622-23
(2004) (noting that “the highly structured, technical rule-making processes required
by the APA provide a means for regulated entities and other affected parties to
participate in agency regulatory activity”). In contrast to its detailed guidance in the
rulemaking arena for steps agencies must take to be transparent and accountable,
the APA is virtually silent on agencies’ exercise of their enforcement responsibilities,
other than in the context of rarely used “formal adjudication.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-
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ties range from involvement in the initial decision to develop
rules and participation in rule formulation (for example, through
negotiated rulemaking46 and FACA Committees47), to participation in the “notice and comment” rulemaking process,48 to challenging rules once they are promulgated or not promulgated.49
57 (explaining the procedures for formal adjudication and hearings but giving little
attention to nonformal procedures). For a review of rulemaking versus adjudication
in terms of accountability and transparency, see ASIMOW ET AL., supra note 43, at
645; Anthony, supra note 5, at 1312 n.2 (noting that, inter alia, “the two styles of
lawmaking are governed by widely different procedural requirements”). See also
Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 97 (2003) (noting that the APA “fails to recognize the new
modes of governance that characterize the administrative state, such as priority setting, resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and strategic enforcement”). Congress and the agencies themselves have filled this APA vacuum in
an ad hoc fashion through initiatives such as the GPRA.
46 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997). Some commentators argue that these
early opportunities for citizen participation, especially negotiated rulemaking, are
not always in the best interests of the public and may be legally problematic in some
contexts. See id. at 1374-87 (examining, inter alia, some of the potential conflicts
between negotiated rulemaking and the APA); William Funk, When Smoke Gets in
Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 57 (1987) (proposing that the regulation of woodstoves
under the CAA, which resulted from negotiated rulemaking, actually violates the
CAA); cf. Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 40 (2000) (concluding that “negotiated rulemaking has been remarkably successful in fulfilling its promise”). For a
rebuttal of Prof. Harter’s article, see Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of
Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386
(2001).
47 Federal Advisory Comission Act (FACA), Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770
(1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-15); Croley, supra note 1, at 13638 (providing empirical data that supports the idea that “federal advisory committee
membership may provide one avenue for fairly broad participation in agency
decisionmaking”).
48 Anthony, supra note 5, at 1314 n.7. Several studies suggest that public participation (for this purpose, non-regulated party participation) in rulemaking is limited,
at least relatively speaking, although other studies suggest that public interest involvement is fairly substantial. See generally Croley, supra note 1, at 129.
49 The case books are full of decisions in which an NGO sued the government,
including the EPA, for various reasons including, for example, for alleged failure to
perform a non-discretionary act, such as purported failure to promulgate a regulation by a date prescribed in the governing statute. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2)
(2000); Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce
Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353, 373-83 (2004) (discussing the
impact that citizen suits seeking “accelerated implementation of existing regulatory
programs” has had on administrative agency practice). Citizens have the ability to
petition agencies to promulgate rules and to obtain judicial review of agency decisions not to do so. See ASIMOW ET AL., supra note 43, at 378-79. There are a wide
variety of possible forms of citizen involvement in addition to those mentioned in
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There are signs that the EPA is trying to internalize this ethos
of enhanced transparency and public engagement well beyond its
rulemaking activities.50 Both federal and state environmental
agencies have paid homage to the notion that citizen education
and involvement is to be encouraged. The EPA’s May 2003 Public Involvement Policy highlights the EPA’s commitment to public involvement. The agency provides a substantial list of goals
for its public involvement processes and promotes “[i]nvolv[ing]
the public early and often throughout the decision-making process” to facilitate achievement of these goals.51 The EPA also
has promulgated regulations that establish requirements for providing information to citizens and for public participation in a
number of its programs.52 States have been experimenting with a
the text. Processes can be structured, for example, to give citizens a veto over
agency decisions, as may occur in the negotiated rulemaking context, depending on
how it is structured. Coglianese, supra note 46, at 1256-57, 1323.
50 For a review of United States federal environmental disclosure requirements,
see Joel A. Mintz, Where Do We Fit In?: U.S. Information Disclosure and Hazardous
Waste Remediation Laws as Compared With the Policy Suggestions of the U.N. Environment Program, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,694 (2003). Carl Bruch and Frances Irwin
have concluded that “[t]he United States has been an international leader in promoting transparency, participation, and accountability, both generally and in the environmental context.” Public Access to Information, Participation, and Justice , in
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 511, 511 (John C. Dernbach ed., Environmental Law Institute 2002).
51 U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF POL’Y, ECON. & INNOVATION, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
POLICY OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/policy2003/policy2003.pdf [hereinafter 2003
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY]. The Agency’s recent expressions of commitment to
public engagement echo earlier statements and actions. See generally 2000 PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION POLICY REVIEW, supra note 43. The agency issued its first Public
Participation Policy on January 19, 1981, but the EPA acknowledges that “[d]uring
the intervening years, knowledge of the 1981 Policy diminished externally and even
within the Agency until 1999.” Id. at 2.
Other agencies, including the SEC, also have explored ways to improve disclosure of
environmentally-related information. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE
TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 10-13 (July 14, 2004), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d04808.pdf. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000), provides for public input for various types
of projects. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 153-54 (Aspen 4th ed. 2003) (noting that NEPA expressly requires
comments from both the public and agencies with environmental expertise regarding environmental impact statements prepared by federal agencies); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.2(d) (2003). Despite the wide range of public involvement initiatives, “more
research on who participates in agency decisionmaking processes is badly needed
before students of regulation can fully understand how the administrative regime
operates and with what substantive consequences.” Croley, supra note 1, at 120.
52 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 25 (captioned “Public Participation in Programs Under

\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE101.txt

14

unknown

Seq: 14

OREGON LAW REVIEW

31-OCT-05

11:22

[Vol. 84, 2005]

wide variety of strategies to facilitate and encourage enhanced
outreach and public participation as well.53
The EPA has expressed its commitment to enhancing citizens’
roles in the enforcement arena, among others. A 1998 EPA “capacity building technical resource” document entitled Citizen Enforcement: Tools for Effective Participation 54 reflects the EPA’s
conviction that citizen engagement in the enforcement arena can
contribute to more effective enforcement efforts. After noting
that “[t]he role of citizens in environmental compliance and enforcement is fairly new in most countries,” the EPA indicates
that “giving citizens the proper tools can enhance government
enforcement efforts.”55 Thus, the EPA has articulated the view
that involving citizens can enhance government enforcement
efforts.
The EPA has taken some initial steps to engage citizens ex ante
in enforcement priority setting. For example, the EPA now solicits public input on its annual enforcement and compliance priorities.56 The agency also routinely solicits public notice and
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and
the Clean Water Act”); 40 C.F.R. pt. 2 (containing the EPA’s Freedom of Information Act regulations); 40 C.F.R. pt. 124 (containing the EPA’s permitting procedures
under RCRA, UIC, PSD, and NPDES, which includes the procedures for issuing
and revocation of such permits); 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (containing the EPA’s Superfund
regulations).
53 For example, New York adopted a law for the siting of power plants that required applicants to establish an “intervener fund” of $300,000 to enable local government officials and interested members of the public to develop the technical
expertise needed to participate meaningfully in the consideration of permit applications. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 160-72 (McKinney 2000) (expired and deemed
repealed Jan. 1, 2003); David Markell & Robert Nakamura, The Effectiveness of
Citizen Participation in the Article X Power Plant Siting Process: A Case Study of the
Athens Project (report submitted to the Hudson River Foundation for Science and
Environmental Research, Inc. Oct. 2002); see also THE ACCESS INITIATIVE—
UNITED STATES, AT THE FRONTLINES OF DEMOCRACY: STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC VOICE IN STATE DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 1-2
(June 2004) (reviewing the extent to which California and Ohio provide access to the
public in environmental decision-making), available at http://www.accessinitiative.
org/pdf/TAIUS_final.pdf.
54 U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CITIZEN
ENFORCEMENT: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION (1998) [hereinafter EPA
CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT].
55 Id. at 1.
56 See, e.g., Enforcement: EPA Seeks Comment on Development of Priorities for
Fiscal Years 2005-2007, 34 ER 2710 (2003); cf. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET
AL., BEYOND ENFORCEMENT?: ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, AND
CORPORATE LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS IN FIVE MIDWEST STATES 17 (2003) (noting
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comment on its enforcement policies.57 States have pursued similar initiatives. For example, for several years New York State’s
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) periodically
convened an Environmental Enforcement Advisory Committee
(EEAC) to review the DEC’s enforcement priorities and to seek
input from interested citizens.58
The EPA also has taken steps to increase transparency in particular enforcement matters. The EPA’s June 2003 SEPs Community Involvement Policy 59 is an example of the agency’s efforts
to engage the public in the enforcement sphere. Supplemental
Environmental Projects (SEPs) are a form of relief in enforcement cases that obligate the settling party to take actions that go
“beyond compliance” in order to protect the environment and
minimize environmental concerns.60 In addition to increasing
the potential for the enforcement process to serve as a tool for
achieving enhanced levels of environmental protection, SEPs are
intended to promote settlements through the additional flexibility they create for resolving cases. Under appropriate circumthat the EPA and state agencies “have . . . largely failed to solicit the views of the
environmental community on high-level issues of compliance strategy”).
57 2000 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION POLICY REVIEW, supra note 43, at 8-9.
58 I participated in a number of EEAC meetings in the mid- to late-1990s. A 2003
ELI study indicates that Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have
also attempted to integrate public participation into their “Performance Partnership
Agreements (PPAs),” but that “public and environmental group involvement . . . is
. . . quite limited in most of the five states.” ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET
AL., supra note 56, at 5, 68.
59 Interim Guidance for Community Involvement in Supplemental Environmental
Projects, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,884 (June 17, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/seps/seps-expandinguse.pdf [hereinafter Interim
Guidance].
60 Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796 (Apr. 10,
1998); Interim Guidance, supra note 59; David A. Dana, The Uncertain Merits Of
Environmental Enforcement Reform: The Case Of Supplemental Environmental
Projects, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1181 (1998). As the EPA explains, a SEP must be, inter
alia, related to the facility’s underlying violation, provide a benefit to the community
adversely affected by the facility’s violation, significantly benefit public and environmental health, and enhance health beyond current environmental law:
The SEP Policy allows EPA to consider a defendant’s or respondent’s willingness to perform an environmentally beneficial project when setting an
appropriate penalty to settle an enforcement action. The purpose of a SEP
is to secure significant environmental or public health protection improvements beyond those achieved by bringing the defendant into compliance.
The SEP must be a new project, where EPA has the opportunity to shape
the scope of the project before it is implemented, and the defendant must
not be otherwise legally required to do the work.
Interim Guidance, supra note 59 at 35,886 n.3.
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stances, a regulated party and the EPA may agree to a settlement
that includes a reduced penalty in exchange for the regulated
party’s undertaking a SEP.61 The EPA’s 2003 SEPs Community
Involvement Policy encourages EPA officials and regulated party
representatives interested in a SEP to seek public input concerning the SEP. Among other features, the SEP policy directs EPA
staff to facilitate citizen involvement by giving a defendant a
more substantial reduction in a penalty in exchange for the defendant’s implementing a SEP if the defendant solicits community input as part of the process.62 The agency notes that its
intention in issuing the guidance is to “encourage EPA personnel
to involve communities in supplemental environmental
projects.”63
Citizens may participate in administrative and civil enforcement cases in certain other circumstances as well.64 Citizens may
intervene in some cases.65 Citizens also may comment on proposed settlements of such cases.66 The United States Depart61

Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,796.
Interim Guidance, supra note 59 at 35,886. The EPA notes that inclusion of the
community in the SEP process may benefit the defendant, the community, the environment, and the EPA, for a variety of reasons. The agency suggests that, for example, communities can be a “valuable source of SEP ideas.” Id. at 35,887.
63 Id. at 35,884.
64 Citizens participate in agency environmental decision-making processes in numerous ways other than those discussed in the text, including in state and federal
environmental permitting processes. See Gerrard & Herz, supra note 30 (reviewing
strategies for improving citizen participation in NEPA); 2003 PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT
POLICY, supra note 51, at 2 (supporting public participation, “particularly in environmental permitting programs”); Leroy Paddock, Environmental Accountability
and Public Involvement, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 243, 244, 258-60 (2004) (suggesting that “most existing public participation techniques do little to enhance accountability,” but also noting that the EPA has taken some steps to improve public
participation in the permitting arena). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) provides technical assistance grants (TAG) to encourage public involvement in the CERCLA cleanup
process. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(c)(2)(ii) (2004). Citizens also may directly sue a
violator under citizen suit provisions in many environmental laws. See, e.g., Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000).
65 A citizen may intervene in EPA proceedings if the citizen “claims an interest
relating to the cause of action; a final order may impair the citizen’s ability to protect
that interest,” and the citizen’s “interest is not adequately represented by existing
parties.” 40 C.F.R. § 22.11(a). Alternatively, a citizen may request to file a nonparty brief. Id. § 22.11(b).
66 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(3)(A)-(B); 40 C.F.R. § 22.45 (supplemental rules governing public notice and comment); Clean Air Act (CAA) § 113(g), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (requiring notice and an opportunity for written public comment before a final consent
order or settlement is issued).
62
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ment of Justice (DOJ) notices consent decrees that it settles on
behalf of the EPA in the Federal Register and allows comment
prior to final entry by the court. Public comment also sometimes
is allowed in the administrative enforcement realm.67
In addition, the EPA has created a process that allows citizens
to petition the agency to withdraw authorization of state programs in cases in which citizens believe that a state is not performing its enforcement responsibilities effectively.68 Given the
substantial extent of program delegations,69 opportunities for citizens to express concerns to the EPA about state performance
clearly hold important potential. However, based on their use to
date, the value of such mechanisms remains in question.70
Citizens also work with government officials by supplementing
government compliance-promotion and environmental enforcement efforts through citizen monitoring of natural resources and
releases. Several observers have suggested that enforcement
agencies are typically under-staffed, and therefore citizens fill an
important role by providing such supplementary monitoring capacity.71 As two commentators put it: “[t]he sheer size of the
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (addressing opportunities for public comment on consent decrees); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4)(A) (providing for notice and comment on proposed administrative penalties); Mark
Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1701, 1708-09 (2005)
(discussing public participation in administrative enforcement penalty actions). The
DOJ files any comments it receives in federal court and it reserves its right to withdraw from the settlement based on the comments. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d); 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.7(b). Van Heuvelen and Breggin cite specific cases in which citizen comments
have affected the terms of the final settlement. R.I. Van Heuvelen & Linda K. Breggin, Citizen Participation in U.S. Environmental Enforcement , 1 INT’L CONF. ON
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT PROC. 573, 576 (1992).
68 40 C.F.R. § 123.64(b)(1); see CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL
RELATIONSHIP 329-35 (Envtl. Law Inst. 2003).
69 See infra Part II.A.
70 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 329 (“This threat [of withdrawing state program authorization] is more theoretical than real . . . since EPA has
never fully withdrawn a state environmental program, and probably is unlikely to do
so in the near future.”). A November 2004 article indicates that nineteen petitions
have been filed asking the EPA to withdraw NPDES permitting authority from fourteen states, and that the EPA “probably will not address” these petitions until it
completes a “comprehensive review of state permitting programs . . . .” Permit Review Initiative Delays Action on Petitions to Withdraw State Authority , Nat’l Env’t
Daily (BNA), (Nov. 22, 2004), at A-9.
71 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation Of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 190-92, 223-24 (2000) (suggesting that “[a]ny increase in monitoring, so long as the monitoring does not invade privacy, generates a
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citizenry . . . enables individual citizens to monitor compliance
throughout the nation and identify violations an understaffed investigative agency might miss.”72 The EPA itself has highlighted
the value that citizens can add in the monitoring context, noting
that “[c]itizens can contribute to monitoring by tracking industrial environmental performance through independently-compiled emissions data or compliance reports produced by
regulated entities.”73 In a 1998 report, the EPA offered the illustration that “Virginia has established a coordinator of citizens
who volunteer to monitor streams in the state. This program allows citizens to collect information needed by the state water
program to detect potential problems or violations around the
state.”74 Legal incentives have been established to encourage citizen monitoring and reporting in some cases.75 Incident reporting hotlines have facilitated such partnering.76 Riverkeepers,
Baykeepers, and similar natural resource-oriented citizens’ orgapotential benefit to all members of society, with no significant downside,” and that
in some cases citizen monitoring may surpass the quality of government efforts because “citizen monitoring groups can produce innovations of broad use in enforcement. Freed of governmental constraints and spurred by the need to attract funding
from private sources, many volunteer monitoring groups have developed sophisticated monitoring systems that rival and sometimes exceed the capabilities of local
public enforcement agencies.”). Van Heuvelen and Breggin identify a number of
mechanisms the EPA has adopted to encourage active citizen participation in identifying and reporting potential violations and discuss potential downsides to citizen
involvement, but conclude that these downsides are offset by the potential benefits:
“[T]he disadvantages . . . for the government are outweighed by the advantages that
private enforcement activity brings to environmental enforcement in the United
States.” Van Heuvelen & Breggin, supra note 67, at 574-81.
72 E. Roberts & J. Dobbins, The Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement, 1 INT’L CONF. ON ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT PROC. 531, 532 (1992). See also Ken
Currie, Are Environmental Complaints from Citizens of Any Value? , ECOSTATES 36
(Spring 2004), available at http://www.complianceconsortium.org/StoredDocuments/
ECC/SAS_Ecostates_article.pdf.
73 EPA CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54, at 8 (1998).
74 Id.
75 See Thompson, Jr., supra note 71, at 226-35 (discussing three such incentives:
(1) whistleblower provisions, which protect employees who report violations from
employer retaliation, are included in nearly every federal environmental statute; (2)
federal reward provisions, which entitle an informant to a reward if there is a successful enforcement action, are included in some federal and state statutes; and (3)
The False Claims Act and qui tam actions, which allow the informant to either receive a percentage of the penalties or, if the government does not prosecute, to
prosecute the violator himself.).
76 Id. at 226 (citing H. Jane Lehman, In Search of Coolant Scofflaws, WASH. POST,
Feb. 13, 1993, at E1).
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nizations have played an important role in this area.77
In light of the broad range of government (and citizen and regulated party-driven) initiatives of this sort, it is no surprise that
some commentators have suggested that efforts to enhance transparency and public engagement have taken center stage in environmental governance, and have gained an increasing role in
environmental policymaking.78 Yet, as noted above, I believe
that digging a little deeper into the actual operation of the administrative state may provide a different picture of its operation
in terms of opportunities for public involvement and government
accountability than one might draw based on the types of developments described above.79 In Part II, I identify two central features of our environmental “compliance-promotion” apparatus
that seemingly have the potential, independently and in tandem,
to reduce government accountability and openness, as well as its
effectiveness.80
II
CENTRAL FEATURES OF HOW AGENCIES APPROACH
COMPLIANCE-PROMOTION IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL ARENA
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
For the past thirty years or so, “cooperative federalism” has
77 See id. at 220-23 (discussing the evolution of a second strand of citizen
monitors, or “‘keeper’ organizations”).
78 THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 1 (Resources for the Future 2002).
For other examples of a focus on public participation, see, for example, Executive
Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7632 (Feb. 11, 1994), directing federal agencies to
facilitate public participation and access to information. Not everyone who has observed this apparent trend concurs that participation is a good idea. See, e.g., Rossi,
supra note 41, at 174-75 (noting the “fetish for public participation”). As noted
supra note 40, there has been a retreat from transparency in some contexts, because
of security and other concerns.
79 See supra note 22.
80 For the most part, I devote little attention in this article to the issue of effectiveness. In the enforcement arena in particular, there is considerable uncertainty regarding optimal levels of compliance. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage
Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law , 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 316 (1999); David L. Markell, The Role of DeterrenceBased Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2000). At the same
time, numerous commentators have raised concerns in recent years concerning the
efficacy of government enforcement. See, e.g., Farber, supra, at 301 (raising the
concern that the failure to comply is “endemic”). See also infra note 87.
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served as the modus operandi for much of the administrative
state in the environmental regulatory arena.81 Under this system, Congress had adopted a series of environmental laws intended to address some of the nation’s most pressing
environmental challenges, such as protection of the air, water,
and land from various types of pollution.82 Congress charged the
EPA with implementing these laws and achieving their goals,
while also empowering the EPA to delegate primary responsibility for implementing (including enforcing) these laws to qualified
states.83
A significant development in environmental governance since
the enactment of the major federal environmental laws has been
the widespread delegation to the states of front line authority for
implementing these laws. For example, the EPA has authorized
forty-nine states to implement the basic Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) program,84 and forty-five states have
primary responsibility for implementing the Clean Water Act’s
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program.85 Thus, the EPA has considerably reduced
front line responsibility for much of the work in environmental
81 I am referring primarily to the modern versions of the Clean Water Act, Clean
Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, each of which was
adopted in the 1970s. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (2000)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016992k; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 120-21 (3d ed.
2000). Other federal laws, such as the Superfund law and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), follow very different models. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); see also Robert H. Abrams,
Comment, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 265, 266-67 (1997) (explaining why Congress might have diverted
from the cooperative federalism model); David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund
Program: Proposals for Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship , 18 WM. &
MARY J. ENVTL L. 1 (1993) (reviewing federal/state relations under CERCLA).
82 See supra note 81.
83 See supra note 81; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INST., COMPARISON OF FEDERALSTATE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN FIVE ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES (1995)
(reviewing authorization requirements under several environmental statutes).
84 See U.S. EPA, RCRA STATE AUTHORIZATION, KEY RULE STATUS AS OF
MARCH 31, 2005, available at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state/stats/
maps/keychrt.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2005). The extent of devolution varies within
statutes because statutes typically include several programs.
85 See U.S. EPA, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM, SPECIFIC STATE PROGRAM STATUS, available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.
cfm?program_id=45&view=general (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
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regulatory implementation, such as drafting and issuing permits,
monitoring compliance, and pursuing non-compliance when violations occur.86 In many cases, the EPA has delegated such authority to the states.87 In Steven Brown’s phrase, the states
“have become the primary environmental protection agencies
across the nation.”88 The states now administer far more regulatory programs than does the EPA.
A second key aspect of contemporary environmental governance is the expansion of the EPA’s “tool box” for promoting
compliance. A feature of the early years of implementation of
86 See infra Part II.A. The EPA’s role in environmental policy and implementation continues to be significant. In the norm-setting context, for example, because
states must have programs at least as stringent as the EPA’s, EPA’s standards, at
least in theory, set a floor for environmental protection throughout the country. See
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In fashioning its guidelines on both participation and penalties, the EPA endeavored to
reconcile the competing objectives of regulatory uniformity and state autonomy by
establishing a floor for citizen participation and state enforcement authority, while
ensuring that states have the maximum possible independence. See also Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,382 (May 19, 1980). The EPA
similarly retains authority in the implementation context, including authority to review state permits and, if necessary, to veto them and issue its own; authority to
conduct its own inspections; and authority to bring its own enforcement actions.
U.S. EPA ENFORCEMENT REORGANIZATION TASK FORCE, INTEGRATED ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES FOR EPA 12 n.4 (1993); CORE EPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE FUNCTIONS 2 (Feb. 21, 1996); GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 949-50;
cf. Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that, at
least under RCRA, the EPA may not overfile if a state has brought an enforcement
action).
87 See supra notes 84-85. U.S. EPA, INNOVATING FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL
RESULTS: A STRATEGY TO GUIDE THE NEXT GENERATION OF INNOVATION AT EPA
8 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/innovation/pdf/strategy.pdf.
88 See, e.g., R. Steven Brown, The Funding Gap: One Billion Dollars Short , ECOSTATES 3 (Winter 2004). Mr. Brown serves as Executive Director of the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS), the “national non-profit, non-partisan
association of state and territorial environmental commissioners.” See archive.gao.
gov/d24t8/140941.pdfhttp://www.sso.org/ecos/about/about.htm (last visited Aug. 5,
2005). Numerous officials and commentators have emphasized the importance of
the states. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO ENHANCE STATE
CAPACITY 2 (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocirpage/nepps/pdf/2005_sem_
pp1-9.pdf; U.S. GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, FEDERAL-STATELOCAL RELATIONS: TRENDS OF THE PAST DECADE AND EMERGING ISSUES 3 GAO/
HRD-90-34 (1990); Markell, supra note 81, at 32-33 (citing, inter alia, a former EPA
enforcement head’s statement that the federal/state relationship is of central importance to the effective administration of the environmental laws); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1196 (1977) (noting that “[t]he
federal government . . . is dependent upon state and local authorities to implement
these [federal environmental] policies”).
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the federal environmental regulatory infrastructure was that the
EPA primarily used a “deterrence-based” approach to induce
regulated parties to comply with legal obligations under the environmental laws.89 The Environmental Law Institute (ELI), for
example, has observed that “[t]raditionally, compliance has been
nearly synonymous with enforcement.”90 The ELI explains that
“[t]his approach reflects the view that policing and deterring violations are the essential core of environmental agencies’ activities
and that other compliance activities are either (1) secondary and
dispensable or (2) second-best compromises made to accommodate the realities of limited resources.”91 Although its shift in
focus might be characterized as halting, and certainly remains a
work in progress,92 the EPA generally has embraced a version of
what has been characterized as an “integrated compliance program”93 in which deterrence-based enforcement is only one piece
in a large tool box of compliance-promotion approaches.94 The
states appear to have done so to an even greater degree.95
These now central features of environmental governance—
states’ preeminent role as implementers96 and the expansion in
strategies to promote compliance97—did not sneak up on anyone. Instead, policy makers and multiple commentators have affirmatively endorsed and pursued them98 and embraced progress
89 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 2-3. As has been
pointed out, there was a significant divide between the theory of enforcement and its
practice during this extended formative period. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan et al.,
Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter? ,
37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 51 (2003); RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 61,
81-83.
90 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 2.
91 Id.
92 See infra Part III.A.; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at
67 (“integrated compliance programs are still in their infancy”).
93 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 2.
94 See infra Part II.B. Mark Stoughton et al., Toward Integrated Approaches to
Compliance Assurance, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,266 (2001).
95 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 146-60; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 2 (“Over the past decade, they [state environmental agencies] have begun to devote increasing resources to experimentation and
have adopted a more varied set of compliance activities.”).
96 See supra note 88.
97 See infra Part II.B.
98 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 21-24;
SHELLEY H. METZENBAUM, STRATEGIES FOR USING STATE INFORMATION: MEASURING AND IMPROVING STATE PERFORMANCE 14-21 (IBM Center for The Business
of Government 2003).
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in making them a reality.99
I share the view that there is much promise in devolution, and
in more flexible and contextually tailored application of compliance tools.100 But I also believe that in the real world of regulatory implementation, each of these features, alone and in the
aggregate, has some potential to reduce the transparency and accountability of governance, and that those interested in the formulation and implementation of environmental policy would be
well-served by giving some attention and consideration to these
potential impacts. This Part reviews these central elements of
the basic operation of the regulatory state in the environmental
compliance arena, with special attention to the issues of transparency and accountability in particular.
A. Devolution: The States as Primary Implementers of the
Federal Environmental Regulatory Infrastructure
The division of responsibility between our federal and state
governments is an important feature of the nation’s approach to
implementation of the environmental laws, including ensuring
compliance with those laws.101 There has been considerable support for the past several years, transcending political administrations, for devolution of authority from the federal to the state
governments. In 1999, President Clinton’s “Federalism” Execu99 For example, a joint state/EPA task force created the National Environmental
Performance Partnership System in 1995 to develop and outline the cooperative nature of environmental enforcement. U.S. EPA, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM, available at http://www.epa.gov/Region2/nepps/
index.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004); see METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 5; infra
note 104 and accompanying text.
100 My views stem in part from my experience as Director of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation’s Division of Environmental Enforcement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I have written elsewhere about various DEC
initiatives, which in my view reflect some of the benefits of devolution and integrated compliance approaches. See, e.g., David L. Markell, Enforcement Challenges
and Priorities for the 1990s: A State Perspective, 1 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 30
(1991); Enforcement Trends at the DEC, 9 N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOC. ENVTL. L. SECTION J. 14 (1989); Some Thoughts on Running a Superfund Enforcement Program: A
State Perspective, 5 NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3 (1990); States as Innovators:
It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994)
[hereinafter States as Innovators].
101 See, e.g., supra note 88. Review of the large scholarly literature concerning the
benefits and disadvantages of devolution is well beyond the scope of this article. See
generally Stewart, supra note 88, at 1210-11; RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra
note 68, at 21-43; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 579 (2001).
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tive Order directed that federal agencies “grant the States the
maximum administrative discretion possible” to implement federal programs.102 The Bush Administration has evidenced at
least equal interest in devolving authority to the states in the environmental arena.103
At a framework level, the EPA and the states have taken numerous steps to foster increased state autonomy. These actions
have included the creation of the National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS), which was intended to
fundamentally change the state-federal relationship by, inter alia,
giving states greater flexibility in their choice of strategies while
also holding them accountable for results.104 The Environmental
Law Institute has characterized NEPPS as “the most substantial
reform in the EPA-state relationships since those relationships
were first established over twenty-five years ago.”105
At an operational level, states largely have taken over environmental program implementation. That is, the essential alignment
of roles and responsibilities for implementation of our environmental laws, including enforcement, has the states in the lead
role, with the EPA providing oversight.106 Executive Director of
the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) Steven Brown
indicates that by 1996 states were administering seventy-five percent of the major federal delegable environmental programs.107
102

Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999).
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 17-18. The phenomenon of
the United States contracting out its responsibilities extends beyond the states and
the particular context of devolution, and certainly beyond the environmental arena.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some thoughts on the
Grammar of Governance, in RETHINKING PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (forthcoming
2005) (on file with author) (highlighting the need for the administrative state to
“develop means to hold contracted-out private power accountable,” a different issue
than devolution but a related one).
104 OFFICE OF STATE & LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS, U.S. EPA, JOINT COMMITMENT
TO REFORM OVERSIGHT AND CREATE A NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP SYSTEM 1, 5 (1995). See also METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 5
(noting that “NEPPS was embraced . . . as a way to make clear that, instead of the
EPA’s historical emphasis on assuring state completion of a negotiated number of
explicitly specified activities, the federal agency could use environmental progress
and compliance outcomes as the dominant criteria for program accountability.”).
We provide a fairly detailed overview of NEPPS in RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL,
supra note 68, at 169-91.
105 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, An Independent Review of the State-Federal
Partnership Agreements for 1996, at 6, 11 (1996).
106 See supra notes 84-88.
107 Brown asserts that “the last 20 years has seen a rapid growth in state assumption of these federal programs.” R. Steven Brown, The States Protect the Environ103
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Intuitively, at least at first glance, there may be reason to think
that it should make little difference whether the states or the
EPA has the lead in implementing our environmental laws. The
cooperative federalism model includes several features that are
intended to ensure that authorized states have the capacity and
will to implement environmental laws effectively, and thereby,
inter alia , avoid a “race-to-the-bottom.”108 The federal environmental statutes, for example, generally allow an individual state
to take the lead in implementing a particular federal environmental program (for example, the permitting program under the
Clean Water Act that allows the discharge of pollutants from
“point sources”) only if its laws are at least as stringent as the
federal counterpart.109 Further, the EPA serves as a gatekeeper
and must satisfy itself that a state has the capacity to implement a
federal program effectively, beyond simply having the legal authority to do so.110 In addition, the EPA develops annual agreement, ECOSTATES (Summer 1999); see also Brown, supra note 88, at 3;
METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 9 (noting that agencies such as the Department of
Education, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Department of Labor, and several others “depend heavily on
other levels of government to accomplish their goals”).
108 While there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which there ever was a
“race-to-the-bottom” and whether one is occurring now, there appears to be a consensus that Congressional fears about such a race played an important role in adoption of the federal environmental laws. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note
68, at 15, 21-25.
109 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000) (“[A] State . . . may not
adopt or enforce any . . . standard of performance which is less stringent than the . . .
standard of performance under this chapter . . . .”); 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) (2004)
(CWA NPDES); id. § 271.16(c) (RCRA). The ELI has compiled a helpful summary
of authorization requirements under a variety of federal environmental laws. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 83. See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN &
MARKELL, supra note 68, ch. 3.
110 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); 40 C.F.R. § 123.22 (allowing the administrator to
approve the submitted program only if the state has standards at least as stringent as
those in federal law, and shows that they have enough personnel and other capacity
to administer the program). Numerous observers have suggested that the EPA has
authorized states to serve as primary enforcers even though the states lack basic
legal enforcement authorities that the EPA has determined are central to the operation of an effective enforcement program. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 61-62 (noting that “[s]ome states lack critical
enforcement tools,” such as administrative penalty authority and sufficient penalty
authority, and also have overly complex procedural requirements for enforcement);
Markell, supra note 80, at 38-39. See ABA Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice Section Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 2004) (on file with author)
(recommending that a regulatory agency should use administratively imposed monetary penalty regimes as part of its enforcement scheme); ABA House of Delegates
Daily Journal, 2004 Annual Meeting (Aug. 9-10, 2004) (on file with author) (approv-
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ments with states that commit states to perform pursuant to EPA
expectations.111 Finally, the EPA oversees state performance.112
The EPA retains the power in authorized states to conduct its
own inspections and to pursue its own enforcement actions if it
deems necessary.113 The EPA also has the power to withdraw
state authorization under appropriate circumstances.114 At least
in theory, in short, several structural features of the federal-state
relationship are intended to limit the difference in government
regulatory performance, regardless of whether the EPA or a state
has primary responsibility for implementing the environmental
laws in a particular state.115
ing the Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section’s recommendation).
For a view that the EPA should play a stronger role as gatekeeper, see RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 291-95.
111 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 116-23.
112 The EPA has been unwilling to implement a strategy of differential oversight
or any meaningful kind of a public spotlighting approach to call public attention to
comparative state performance, despite the potential that some commentators, including this author, claim for such approaches based on their use in other contexts.
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 319-29; see also Markell, supra
note 80, at 102-08, nn. 393 & 408. For what struck me as an unusually forthright
statement about the federal/state relationship, see Leslie Carothers, Outside Judicial
Opinions, States Need EPA Oversight, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 56 (Sept./Oct.
2004).
The provision for federal oversight of state regulation of new or expanded
major [air pollution] sources in particular is more critical than ever for both
political and scientific reasons . . . . The litigation now occurring over New
Source Review between states and EPA and among states is a sign of the
need for EPA oversight of key state permitting decisions and of a loss of
confidence that adequate oversight is occurring. This is the real world.
Id.
113 The case law on this issue is still evolving. See generally GLICKSMAN ET AL.,
supra note 51, at 949. A recent article identifies some initiatives to enhance coordination between state and federal enforcers. James O. Payne, Jr. et al., Partners in
Pursuit of Polluters: State/Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement , 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 24, 24 (Spring 2004) (noting that the United States DOJ has instituted a system for early discussion of cases with state enforcers and that “[i]n recent
years . . . state and federal governments have been joining together as co-plaintiffs
in record numbers”). The authors suggest that “[s]tate/federal collaboration is leading to increased information sharing, stronger case resolutions, and better leverage
of scarce enforcement resources.” Id. at 26.
114 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 271.23 (2004) (RCRA provision and EPA regulations relating to program withdrawal). The agency can withdraw authorization on its own, sua sponte, or in response to a citizen petition. For
an example of the latter, see U.S. EPA, DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER CAUSE
EXISTS TO COMMENCE PROCEEDINGS TO WITHDRAW THE LOUISIANA RCRA PROGRAM, RESPONSE TO THE PETITIONERS (Apr. 28, 2004) (denying the petition and
determining not to commence such a proceeding) (on file with author).
115 It became clear early on in the implementation of this cooperative federalism
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But the reality appears to be far different. The state-federal
relationship has not been particularly smooth.116 Intuitively, this
result should not be surprising. As Professor Shelley Metzenbaum, former EPA Associate Administrator for the Office of
State and Local Relations and currently Executive Director of
the Environmental Compliance Consortium117 (“a voluntary collaboration among state environmental agencies to improve the
effectiveness of their compliance and enforcement programs”118)
has observed, “Federal agencies that set goals for or measure the
performance of states often find themselves in testy territory.
For both political and practical reasons, states resent efforts by
the federal government to influence their goals and their performance levels.”119
experiment in the environmental arena that the EPA was not interested in micromanaging the states or in demanding a cookie cutter approach to implementation of
the environmental laws, but instead intended to cede considerable autonomy to the
states. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 174 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA regulations that allowed states to take over primary responsibility for the Clean Water permitting program even if their penalty authorities
were far weaker than the EPA’s, rejecting the claim that the EPA must require states
to mirror federal approaches, and holding that the EPA had the discretion to “reconcile the competing objectives of regulatory uniformity and state autonomy by establishing a floor for . . . state enforcement authority, while ensuring that states have
the maximum possible independence”). Some states nevertheless would undoubtedly assert that the EPA has, in fact, engaged in considerable micro-management.
RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 133, 144-45. For reasons why devolution might enhance environmental protection or otherwise might have welfareinducing effects, and for concerns that devolution is likely to undermine environmental protection, see, for example, id. at 22-35.
116 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 144-45.
117 See University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Shelley Metzenbaum, at
http://www.puaf.umd.edu/facstaff/faculty/metzenbaum.html (last visited July 23,
2005).
118 Environmental Compliance Consortium, About the ECC, at http://www.complianceconsortium.org/About/About.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
119 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 9. As Professor Metzenbaum observes, the
EPA has exacerbated this situation by providing oversight in highly inconsistent
ways from region to region. “Because of this variation, many states perceived EPA
oversight more as a reflection of individual personalities . . . than as consistent national policies designed to improve environmental quality and fairness.” Id. at 17.
Part of the tension, however, was likely because as states began to build their capacity, they began to “chafe” under the EPA’s traditional activities-based oversight
scheme and they began to push for an oversight system that gave them more flexibility. Id.
In part because of pressure from the states, the general direction of EPA/state
relations appears to be toward greater state autonomy and, correspondingly, less
EPA leverage in its oversight capacity. A central objective of the NEPPS discussions was to reform the state/federal relationship in a way that would provide states
with greater flexibility and reduce certain types of EPA oversight. The flip side was
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The cooperative federalism model, because of this tension and
for other reasons, has created several challenges for managing
and implementing environmental laws. One of the seemingly
more important challenges, for purposes of this article, is that
devolution appears to have significantly complicated management of relevant data.120 The result is that devolution has made
it much more difficult to monitor government activity—to understand and to follow what government officials are doing, and
what they are accomplishing.121
that states and the EPA would use new and improved measures of performance to
heighten state accountability. See, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note
68, at 187. As indicated below, progress toward this latter objective has been slow
and halting and, certainly, progress remains incomplete. See infra note 121.
120 The discussion in the text is intended to be illustrative of the multiple challenges that government officials have faced in managing data because of the extant
federal system, rather than to provide comprehensive treatment of this issue. For
more on this topic, see U.S. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: MORE CONSISTENCY NEEDED AMONG EPA REGIONS IN APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT (2000),
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00108.pdf [HEREINAFTER GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION]; U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO ADDRESS FUNDING SHORTFALLS AND TIME SLIPPAGES IN PERMIT
COMPLIANCE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION EFFORT (2003), available at www.epa.gov/
oigearth/reports/2003/20030520_2003-M-00014.pdf; RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL,
supra note 68. The EPA has long been aware of data-related problems, and it continues to work on these issues. See, e.g., States, Tribes Awarded $20 Million in Grants
To Expand Environmental Exchange Network, Nat’l Env’t Daily (BNA), Oct. 18,
2004, at A-4 (noting that the EPA has awarded 67 grants to states and others, for a
total of more than $20 million, “to help the continued expansion of an upgraded
computer network to allow EPA to receive environmental data from their computers”). BNA notes that “[f]or years, EPA has grappled with a way to tie in separate national data systems” and that the Bush Administration is pursuing an “‘EGovernment’ initiative.” Id. Problems with data extend far beyond the enforcement
realm. See, e.g., Environmental Integrity Project, Flying Blind: Water Quality Monitoring and Assessment in the Great Lakes States vii (March 2004), available at www.
environmentalintegrity.org/pubs/Report_-__Flying_Blind.pdf (concluding that because “the states are far from achieving comprehensive, accurate, and reliable water
monitoring and assessment . . . national and regional ‘pictures’ of water quality are
overstated and often misleading”). Devolution raises numerous other concerns as
well. See supra note 115.
121 While the focus in the text is mostly on state performance, the EPA bears
considerable responsibility for this performance. The 2001 NAPA panel indicates
that, for example, in ECOS’s view, data problems are due to at least four significant
issues: (1) flaws in EPA’s main-frame databases, which include “outmoded designs
and difficult data entry protocols”; (2) guidance interpretations, which are
“problems with interpretation of EPA guidance for using the systems, including frequent coding changes”; (3) time lags in terms of when data are entered; and (4)
differences in definitions of key terms. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS: HOW EPA AND THE STATES
CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE INFORMATION 16
(2001), available at http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/environ-
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Professor Metzenbaum has explained some of the reasons why
dependence on states has been particularly problematic in terms
of data management. After explaining that states had historically
submitted data to the EPA, but that the EPA provided little of
value back to the states, Metzenbaum describes the states’ natural reaction:
With little data coming back to states from EPA, many states
built their own information systems over the years so they
could more easily retrieve information they needed to manage
their programs. As states built their own systems, system incompatibilities arose, requiring many states to enter data separately into both EPA’s systems and their own. Not
surprisingly, since states primarily relied upon their own systems, they spent little time worrying about the quality of the
information in EPA’s systems.122

Professor Metzenbaum continued by noting that the compliance-related data in the EPA’s systems are fraught with
problems: “A spate of analysis on state compliance and inspection programs conducted by public interest groups in 1999 and
2000 using the EPA’s compliance databases made clear how seriously flawed data in some of the EPA’s systems were.”123
mental.pdf [hereinafter EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS]. Concerns have
been raised (by this author, among others) about the EPA’s willingness or capability
to perform its oversight role responsibly. See Markell, supra note 81, at 3-5, 31-35;
Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State Environmental Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and Other
Strategies, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,559, 10,560 (2003); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of
Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995); Farber, supra note
80, at 303.
122 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 17. States also collected more data than they
were required to report to the EPA and incorporated such data into their own systems. Mary Blakeslee, ECOS (Jan. 26, 2005 e-mail, on file with author). See also
DAVID FREDERICKSON, THE POTENTIAL OF THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND
RESULTS ACT AS A TOOL TO MANAGE THIRD-PARTY GOVERNMENT 8, 12 (Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Bus. of Gov’t, 2001), available at www.
businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/Frederickson_Report.pdf (noting that, based on a
study of HHS agencies, “[a]dding to the difficulty of measuring performance in the
federal system is the fear of state and local governments that performance measurement will be used as another form of federal mandate”).
123 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 17 (citing ECOS, Report to Congress: State
Environmental Agency Contributions to Enforcement and Compliance 53-70 (April
2001)). For others that have reached the same conclusion, see, for example, EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 23 (“The Academy Panel
concludes that, as the studies by ECOS and GAO note, there are fundamental
problems with existing enforcement and compliance data.”); U.S. EPA OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., EPA SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO ADDRESS FUNDING
SHORTFALLS AND TIME SLIPPAGES IN PERMIT COMPLIANCE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION EFFORT 7 (2003), available at www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/2003/20030520_
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The disincentives for states to be full partners in EPA data
management efforts that Professor Metzenbaum describes is part
of the issue when it comes to data, but others exist too.124 First,
developing and reaching agreement on common definitions of
key terms for compliance-related data has proven to be a major
challenge. “Standardization” and “normalization” of data, in
other words, have been greatly complicated because of our cooperative federal system.125 The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA), after reviewing the compliance-related
data that the states themselves compiled and provided,126 concluded that the utility of the data was quite limited because
“[the data] are not comparable.”127 Among other flaws, “the
definitions of key enforcement terms used by states to report
their activity statistics to ECOS are not uniform, making it difficult to compare one state to another.”128
2003-M-00014.pdf (“Without a modernized [data system], EPA’s Office of Water
cannot effectively manage its Clean Water . . . program.”).
124 To provide one example not discussed in the text, the EPA and the states have
had enormous problems integrating data across the media programs. As NAPA and
ELI found, “data systems in several of the states are not integrated across the various media programs, making the information difficult to use and difficult for the
public to access or understand.” ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra
note 56, at 5, 68. They concluded that all five states covered in the 2003 study need
to “improve their information systems so they can integrate data across media programs and can provide the public with more understandable data on both environmental progress and facility compliance.” Id. ; see also EVALUATING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 2 (noting that the problem is a combination of the EPA’s traditional medium-specific structure and state deficiencies:
“[t]he current single-medium EPA data systems that manage and monitor the performance of state and EPA enforcement and compliance programs are seriously
flawed. The state activities data recently compiled for ECOS suggest that many
state data systems also have serious limitations.”).
125 The EPA and the states are aware of the normalization issue, and they are
seeking to address it through the core performance measures they have negotiated
and through their creation of the Environmental Data Standards Council, a new
organization that is intended to “agree on common definitions for state measurement efforts.” METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 47-48. Prof. Metzenbaum suggests
that Congressional mandates should be considered if progress is slower than desired.
Id. at 46-47.
126 For background on the state data in the ECOS report and why it was developed, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 61; THE ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL OF THE STATES, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE (2001).
127 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 18.
128 Id.; U.S. OIG, SPECIAL REPORT, CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ON EPA ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS, Report No. 2004-S-00001, at 36
(Oct. 10, 2003) (citing an OMB evaluation that found a “lack of good quality data to
accurately determine compliance and monitor the effectiveness of enforcement ac-
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Further, “state data on compliance rates and return to compliance, although valuable, provide only a general sense about the
effectiveness of these tools because ECOS did not ask the states
how they determined those rates.”129 As a result, the NAPA
Panel cautioned that “the aggregated data and the conclusions
drawn from them in the ECOS study should be used very cautiously.”130 More generally, the NAPA Panel ultimately concluded that the magnitude of data discrepancies due to
normalization-related deficiencies effectively made it impossible
to determine the nature of state enforcement activity or the results such activities were producing:
[T]hese data discrepancies point out that it is very difficult to
aggregate state data, to compare performance across states, or
to draw nationwide conclusions on enforcement efforts using
current state data. Similarly, it is not possible to aggregate
data and draw conclusions about state inspection programs
when the data are not comparable. For example reported data
on inspection rates show wide variations from state to state.
These differences likely have more to do with the number of
programs reporting or differences in inspection definitions
than the actual rate of inspections.131

In short, while the EPA has had more than its fair share of
problems in getting its own staff to be consistent in its approach
to data collection and management,132 the federalism structure of
environmental law implementation has likely made the EPA’s
tivities”) [hereinafter OIG SPECIAL REPORT]. The EPA did not agree with all of
OMB’s findings. Id.
129 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 24.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 25.
132 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, A PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED
COMPONENTS OF THE NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE
PROGRAM 7 (Feb. 2003) (on file with author) (noting that “[t]he quality of data for
pollutant reductions from EPA actions has been gradually improving but continues
to need improvement in accuracy, consistency, and completeness.”) [hereinafter A
PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS]; U.S. OIG, ENFORCEMENT: COMPLIANCE
WITH ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS, Report No. 2001-P-00006 at i (Mar. 2001) (finding that the EPA’s regions did not always adequately monitor compliance with enforcement instruments or consider supplementary enforcement actions even when
such actions might be appropriate); U.S. EPA GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 120; U.S. OIG, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: UNRELIABLE DATA
AFFECTS USABILITY OF DOCKET INFORMATION, Report No. 2002-P-00004 Executive Summary (Jan. 18, 2002) (finding that, inter alia, “our audit determined the
DOCKET system . . . contained significant instances of inaccurate and incomplete
data.”). DOCKET, at the time, was the EPA’s “official database for tracking and
reporting on civil judicial and administrative enforcement actions.” Id. at 1.
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task of creating a useable and accessible set or sets of compliance-related data enormously more difficult because of the challenge of getting fifty state governments to cooperate on an
enormous array of basic elements, including adoption of common definitions, use of the same methodologies, and the like.
Accountability and transparency of environmental compliancerelated information have suffered as a result.133
Similarly, collection and compilation of data have been made
much more challenging because of our federal system. There
have been enormous problems with states’ data entry in terms of
the sufficiency of the data collected, data accuracy and reliability,
and the timeliness of data entry. No doubt this is due, at least in
part, to the lack of value some states traditionally have attributed
to EPA data systems and to states’ creation of their own parallel
data management operations, as Professor Metzenbaum has suggested.134 In its discussion of “partner benefits” associated with
participating in the Environmental Information Exchange Network, the Network’s fact sheet summarizes concerns about data
quality as follows: “[i]n the past, the quality of environmental
data has been compromised due to traditional exchange meth133 Numerous studies have found data normalization problems of the sort highlighted in the text. See, e.g., supra notes 128, 132; U.S. OIG, EPA SHOULD TAKE
FURTHER STEPS TO ADDRESS FUNDING SHORTFALLS AND TIME SLIPPAGES IN PERMIT COMPLIANCE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION EFFORT, Report No. 2003-M-00014
(May 20, 2003); OIG SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 39 (discussing the EPA’s
Permit Compliance System (PCS), which tracks formal enforcement actions under
the CWA. The OIG notes that PCS “has been identified as an Agency weakness
since 1999. Reasons include its reported unreliability due to missing data and data
quality problems.” The OIG indicates that the effort to modernize PCS began in
1997 and that this effort is now in the “detailed design phase”). The EPA and the
states are working on addressing these issues, and indeed have been doing so for
decades. The National Environmental Information Exchange Network is an ongoing initiative that is intended to surface and resolve data-related challenges, such as
the creation of common definitions. See generally, U.S. EPA OFFICE OF ENVTL.
INFO., FISCAL YEAR 2005 ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE NETWORK
GRANT PROGRAM SOLICITATION NOTICE (Oct. 2004). The Exchange Network is
“an Internet- and standards-based, secure information network that facilitates the
electronic reporting, sharing, integration, analysis, and use of environmental data
from many different sources.” Id. at 1. The Solicitation Notice indicates that fiscal
year 2005 will be the fourth year of its grant program, and that the program has
disbursed about $65 million to states, tribes, and territories to date. It appears from
the notice that efforts to update and upgrade the CWA NPDES system are, at least
in the EPA’s view, moving ahead nicely. Id. at App. B-14. The EPA’s relatively
new Enforcement Compliance History Online (ECHO) system is an effort to improve accessibility to facility-specific compliance and enforcement information. See,
e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 70,079 (Nov. 20, 2002) (announcing the availability of ECHO).
134 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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ods, which include faulty data entry, double data entry, transmitting wrong data types through file formats, and sporadic use of
data standards.”135
A candid EPA self-evaluation of its NPDES permitting program notes that data collection and compilation are compromised or undermined because the EPA is less demanding of
states than it is of its own staff in terms of the types of data that
must be reported:
The data that we have for enforcement is relatively plentiful,
but there are known problems with the data, and undoubtedly
other unknown problems. For example, states are not required to report some of the data that would be ideal for answering certain key questions (e.g., data on penalties,
injunctive relief, and pounds of pollutants reduced).136

Finally, dissemination of enforcement and compliance-related
information has suffered considerably because of reliance on the
states to serve as primary implementers of the environmental
laws in our cooperative federalism system of governance. Federal agencies have the potential to play an important “clearinghouse” or “information wholesaler” role in governance,
particularly in a cooperative federalism system.137 One commentator highlights this possibility as follows:
135 Environmental Information Exchange Network, Fact Sheet 2, at http://www.
exchangenetwork.net/resources/documents/en_fact_sheet_2004.pdf (last visited Feb.
16, 2005). The EPA has indicated on several occasions that results are improving on
this front. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2003 ANNUAL REPORT Ch. 6, p. 4
(noting that “In FY 2003, EPA . . . expanded state access to the Environmental
Information Exchange Network, a unified network that integrates access to highquality and integrated air, water, and waste information systems. Currently, 49
states are reporting data electronically through EPA’s network portal, reducing their
reporting burden while increasing the timeliness and accuracy of their reported
data.”).
136 A PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS, supra note 132, at 3 (noting that
“[t]here is a commitment . . . for states to submit penalty data,” but, as of February
2003, the effective date of the data system that would handle such data had been
postponed). Id. at 17 (noting that “States are not . . . required to report penalty data
. . . which limits our ability to draw conclusions about the effect of penalties on
compliance and deterrence.”). Many states collect penalty and other data for their
own use.

The EPA also acknowledges that timeliness traditionally has been a significant concern in terms of the entry and dissemination of data, with the result being that data
are outdated by the time they are available for distribution: “The current time-consuming approaches to data exchange often lead to exchanging outdated information.” Environmental Information Exchange Network, supra note 135, at 2.
137 See METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 44 (noting that “[f]ederal agencies can
play a valuable role few others can play simply by gathering performance informa-
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To encourage use and analysis of the information, federal
agencies that depend on state and local governments for the
accomplishment of their goals should annually compile state
information into a single compendium that is easy to find and
interpret. This information should be made available in print
form and accessible online through a single portal, produced
on a regular schedule, and broadly disseminated.138

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) offers at least one ready framework for doing so.139 As Professor
Metzenbaum suggests: “[f]ederal agencies could use their annual
GPRA performance reports for this purpose. At a minimum,
they should cross-reference where relevant state data can be
found in the annual GPRA performance reports.”140 The EPA is
seemingly well-situated to perform this role. Its serving this function would significantly advance accountability and transparency
in governance by facilitating access to information on government performance.
Unfortunately, the gap appears to be enormous between
promise and reality in terms of dissemination of enforcement and
compliance-related information. For example, it appears that the
2001 NAPA panel reviewed five EPA annual enforcement accomplishments reports, those issued for 1995-1999, inclusive.141
These reports are intended to summarize the nation’s enforcement and compliance assistance efforts and the results they have
produced.142 The NAPA panel concluded that the reports contain little information about state performance, despite the fact
that states are doing most of the work. The panel notes that the
accomplishments reports “have only reflected state enforcement
tion from each state, organizing it to facilitate interpretation, and making it broadly
available.”).
138 Id. at 7.
139 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107
Stat. 285 [hereinafter GPRA] (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
The
EPA’s “Policy Framework” offers another possible framework. U.S. EPA, REVISED
POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS (1986) [hereinafter EPA REVISED POLICY FRAMEWORK]. For a detailed review of this Framework, see RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68. Some state regulators
recognize this framework as an important mechanism and source of guidance. See
Statement of Mark Coleman, Executive Dir., Okla. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, The
Current Relationship between States and the Environmental Protection Agency
(June 10, 1997).
140 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 7.
141 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 46, app. 3.
142 Id. at 24.
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activities in two years, 1996 and 1997.”143 Further, the numbers
“captured in the Reports . . . cover only a limited range of enforcement actions reported to EPA through its data systems.”144
As a result, as the NAPA panel concluded, “Congress and the
public have not had good information on the full extent and nature of EPA and state enforcement and compliance assistance
activities.”145
I reviewed the EPA enforcement accomplishments reports for
2000-2004, inclusive, in an effort to update the NAPA panel’s
work.146 These reports do not appear to be meaningfully better
in terms of providing information on state activities or accomplishments. The EPA’s 2004 Annual Enforcement Accomplishments Report, its most recent at the time this article was being
developed, focuses on “national environmental results and enforcement and compliance activity” and pollution reduction “as a
result of EPA enforcement actions,” with relatively little mention
of state enforcement action.147 Discussions of state enforcement
143

Id.
Id.
145 Id.
146 U.S. EPA, FY 2004 END OF YEAR ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE RESULTS (Nov. 15, 2004); U.S. EPA, FY 2003 END OF YEAR ENFORCEMENT &
COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE RESULTS (Dec. 11, 2003); U.S. EPA, FY 2002 END OF
YEAR ACCOMPLISHMENTS; U.S. EPA, FY 2001 ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT. Documents relating to the EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Accomplishment Reports for years 2001 through 2004 may be
found through links at http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endof
year/.
147 Press Release, U.S. EPA, Enforcement Secures Cleanups Worth a Record $4.8
Billion Preventing One Billion Pounds of Pollution (Nov. 15, 2004), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/04b3e855d5a0b21785256f4d006bd344?
OpenDocument. The EPA’s fiscal year 2004 enforcement “End of Year Accomplishments” currently are packaged as multiple electronic documents, rather than as
a single report. Florida State University law librarian Mary McCormick kindly compiled the following list of electronically-available documents, which together appear
to represent the EPA’s end of year accomplishments report: Press Release, FY2004
End of Year Accomplishments: One Billion Pounds Less Pollution, at http://www.
abuse.com/environment/EPA_Home/Compliance_and_Enforcement/Planning_and_
Results/Results/End_of_Year_Accomplishments/FY2004_End_of_Year_Accomplishments/index.html (last visited July 15, 2005); FY 2004 End of Year Compliance
Assistance Activities Highlights, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2004/2004cahighlights.html (last visited July 15, 2005); Civil Enforcement Highlights FY-2004, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/
endofyear/eoy004/2004civilhighlights.html (last visited July 15, 2005); Criminal Enforcement Highlights FY-2004, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/
endofyear/eoy2004/2004criminalhighlights.html. (last visited July 15, 2005); FY2004
End of Year Case Highlights, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/
endofyear/eoy2004/2004highlights.html (last visited July 15, 2005); Enforcement and
144
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activity appear to be anecdotal, such as the mention of a stateEPA partnership in the settlement of a civil enforcement case.148
In fact, Eric Schaeffer, former Director of Enforcement for the
EPA and now Executive Director of the Environmental Integrity
Project (EIP), charges that the EPA is now providing less information about its own enforcement activities than it did in previous years. Schaeffer claims, for example, that “[i]n the past, EPA
has always reported the number of judicial cases settled or concluded. That data was not included in EPA’s announcement today.”149 Thus, our cooperative federalism model appears to have
had very significant negative consequences for dissemination of
national enforcement and compliance-related information because the EPA, at least in its annual Enforcement Accomplishments Reports, does not appear to have “stepped up to the
plate” to perform a clearinghouse function concerning state
data.150
Compliance Results: Numbers at a Glance, at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2004/2004numbers.html (last visited July 15, 2005).
Ms. McCormick contacted EPA Associate Director for Public Affairs, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Pat Reilly, and learned that the EPA intends
to publish an Accomplishments Report which will put end of year numbers in context and provide a retrospective of the past ten years. While this Report was due out
in April 2005, it had not been released as this article was going to press in August
2005. The EPA does not intend to include a substantial amount of information on
state performance in the forthcoming report because the lack of uniformity in state
approaches (different definitions of basic concepts like inspections, etc.) makes presentation of such information problematic. Further, the EPA is not interested at the
current time in creating a “report card” for evaluation of state performance in the
compliance/enforcement arena. Ms. Reilly indicated that the EPA’s regions collect
considerable data on state performance that is not incorporated into the EPA’s publicly available reports but is maintained in internal management systems. Mary McCormick, telephone call with Pat Reilly (Jan. 28, 2005); E-mail from Pat Reilly to
Mary McCormick (Feb. 23, 2005) (copy on file with author).
148 See, e.g., Civil Enforcement Highlights FY-2004, supra note 147 (noting that
the EPA joined New York, New Jersey and other states in Clean Air Act settlement
actions against private industries).
149 Statement of Eric Schaeffer, Director, Environmental Integrity Project (Nov.
15, 2004) (on file with author) (Mr. Schaeffer attributes the EPA’s decision not to
publish the data about judicial cases to the EPA’s poor record in the area: “[A]nd
no wonder: the Agency’s online data base shows that the Justice Department was
able to conclude fewer than 160 enforcement actions in 2004, the lowest by far in the
ten years that such data has been publicly tracked by EPA.”).
150 The EPA’s Web site is not particularly user-friendly, at least in my experience.
Ms. McCormick and I contacted several individuals at the EPA to try to determine
whether the most likely places to look for state-related enforcement-related data
would be the annual enforcement accomplishments reports and the fiscal year annual reports, or whether the EPA develops other reports or materials that would
contain this information and be publicly accessible. See, e.g., E-mail from David L.
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Congress’s adoption of the GPRA in 1993 required the EPA to
begin reporting the results of government activities, including activities in the enforcement arena.151 The EPA has now issued six
annual reports in fulfilling its obligations under the GPRA.152
Again, I reviewed the relevant section of each of these reports.153
As with the annual Enforcement Accomplishments Reports, the
GPRA-driven reports appear to include minimal coverage of
state performance. The 2004 Annual Report, for example, discusses what the EPA is doing to encourage states to develop new
enforcement techniques,154 but does not discuss what the states
themselves are doing in response to this encouragement. Additionally, in each annual report, the Annual Performance Goals
speak only to EPA performance, not state performance.155 In
her 2003 report, Professor Metzenbaum concludes that the EPA
is reporting little state enforcement information publicly, suggesting that this is probably because of a fear of negative state
reaction to EPA evaluations.156
Markell, Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law, to
Lynn Vendinello, U.S. EPA Headquarters (Dec. 16, 2004, 17:37 EST) (on file with
author).
151 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1115 (2000)).
152 See U.S. EPA FISCAL YEAR 2004 ANNUAL REPORT; U.S. EPA FISCAL YEAR
2003 ANNUAL REPORT; U.S. EPA FISCAL YEAR 2002 ANNUAL REPORT; U.S. EPA,
FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANNUAL REPORT; U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2000 ANNUAL REPORT; U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 1999 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT. All EPA
Annual Reports can be found at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/finstatement/apr.htm (last
updated Nov. 16, 2004).
153 For 1999 through 2002, goal 9 was the relevant section, entitled “A Credible
Deterrent to Pollution and Greater Compliance with the Law.” See U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 99-110; U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ANNUAL
REport 83-91; U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 93-101; U.S. EPA,
FISCAL YEAR 1999 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 97-103. After the EPA
changed its Strategic Plan in 2003, more recent reports have reported enforcementrelated information in goal 5, entitled “Compliance and Environmental Stewardship.” See U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 106-21; U.S. EPA, Fiscal
Year 2003 Annual Report 91-108. It is unclear whether the EPA’s consolidation of
its strategic goals so that it no longer treats compliance independently as a single
goal reflects an effort to diminish the importance of enforcement.
154 U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 106.
155 See, e.g., id. at 110 (reporting the planned target and actual performance for
the EPA’s ten annual performance goals).
156 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 17. These reports do not approach the standard that Professor Metzenbaum recommends. The lack of state information in
EPA Annual Reports may not be unexpected, given that the GPRA “says little
about how federal agencies should integrate information about state and local performance into their GPRA reports.” METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 9. On the
other hand, Professor Metzenbaum concludes that Congress’s failure to require re-
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The bottom line appears to be that neither the EPA’s annual
Enforcement Accomplishments Reports nor the agency’s
GPRA-driven Fiscal Year annual reports contains much information on state performance. The result is that dissemination of
information about government performance has suffered because the EPA has opted not to report in detail on state performance as well as provide information on its own record.157
While, as noted above, it would seem to make the most sense
for the federal government to play a clearinghouse role in disseminating national enforcement information that includes data
on state as well as federal performance, other alternative
frameworks conceivably could be effective in promoting accountability and transparency. One such framework would involve a
division of responsibilities. The EPA would provide information
about its performance and the states independently would do the
same for their performance. Thus, the EPA, through its annual
Enforcement Accomplishments Reports and its GPRA-driven
annual Fiscal Year reports (and possibly through other reporting
as well), could report on its performance. The states, independently or collectively, could report on their performance.
There appears to be some expectation that states will serve in
an “information-dissemination” capacity, but progress on this
front appears to be uneven. NEPPS anticipated that states would
conduct self-assessments and that they would share those assessments with the public.158 Indeed, NEPPS provided that state
self-evaluations were a key element of the framework of greater
state autonomy and flexibility that NEPPS was intended to. creporting of state information is surprising given our cooperative federalism system:
“Given federal reliance on states and localities to accomplish their programmatic
goals, GPRA’s silence on the subject of states is surprising, as is the limited discussion of this subject in the policy guidance documents issued by the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget pertaining to GPRA implementation.” Id. at 9.
157 The EPA generates a wide variety of other reports that may, and in some cases
do, contain enforcement-related information. While such efforts contribute to transparency, they do not seem to offset the failure to include state information in the
fiscal year annual reports or in the annual enforcement accomplishment reports.
See, e.g., JERRY ELLIG, PERFORMANCE REPORT SCORECARD: WHICH FEDERAL
AGENCIES INFORM THE PUBLIC? 4 (George Mason Center May 3, 2000) (noting that
ease of access to these types of reports and awareness of their content are important
aspects of agency accountability: “[p]ublic accountability can only be served if members of the public can actually find out what the agency is doing for them. The
annual report should be made accessible to the public.”), available at http://www.
mercatus.org/pdf/materials/187.pdf.
158 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 17.
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ate.159 But, little such self-assessment has occurred, according to
the EPA’s Office of Inspector General.160
More generally, individual states have made some progress in
developing independent annual reports,161 but it appears that
much remains to be done if state reporting is to fill the void that
exists because of the lack of state data in federal reports. State
reporting is uneven in a variety of ways, including frequency of
reporting, formats used to present information, content of information presented, and accessibility of the state reports.162 To return to a theme discussed earlier,163 normalization or
standardization issues are currently impediments to accountability and transparency of state performance, as is the uneven commitment to reporting such performance.164
In addition to the limited nature of the progress that individual
states have made in compiling and disseminating their own com159

U.S. OIG, EPA NEEDS TO MORE ACTIVELY PROMOTE STATE SELF ASSESSENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 2-4, Report No. 2003-P-00004 (Dec. 27,
2002) (noting that “[s]elf assessment is one of the principal components of NEPPS,”
and also noting that “The NEPPS policy envisioned the self assessment as one of the
tools for . . . allowing states greater flexibility.”).
160 Id. at 2 (noting that the “EPA and states had not widely adopted the self assessment concept. Many states were not performing self assessments, their content
varied, and they had little impact on environmental performance agreements.” The
OIG also stated that “[t]his occurred because EPA had not taken a leadership role
to define to staff and states its expectations for self assessments.”); see also id. at 3
(“Since the NEPPS policy was issued in 1995, EPA had done little to develop and
promote greater reliance on self assessment. EPA had not issued any additional
guidance or training on self assessments. As a result, few regions and states were
performing and effectively using self assessments.”). The OIG noted that it did not
review whether the EPA and the states were performing joint evaluations in lieu of
self-assessments. Id. at 2. It further indicated that based on its discussions with the
EPA, the self assessment process “may be overtaken by improved priority setting
and joint evaluation processes.” Id. at 4. In its comments to the OIG about the
report, the EPA’s Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations states
that it “appreciate[d]” the OIG’s bringing the joint planning process to its attention,
and that the Office “plan[s] to formally include joint evaluation in our work with the
States.” Id. at 9. The Office characterized a joint evaluation process as “much
needed.” Id. at 10.
161 One commentator refers to this progress as significant. This “significant progress” includes “agree[ing] on measures for assessing state performance . . . increas[ing] public access to information about state environmental performance . . .
and heightening attention to priority environmental problems.” METZENBAUM,
supra note 98, at 5.
162 See generally, Environmental Compliance Consortium, at http://www.complianceconsortium.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2005) (providing access to a limited set of
state compliance-related reports).
163 See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
MENT OF
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pliance-related information,165 the limited success to date in aggregating state information (for example, in compiling such
information in one easily accessible place, and in aggregating
compliance-related information for the different states), which
would simplify access and facilitate comparisons and other types
of analyses of the relative and absolute performance of states,
also undermines the effectiveness of state reporting efforts in
promoting accountability and transparency. Two state consortium-type bodies, ECOS166 and the Environmental Compliance
Consortium (ECC),167 have made efforts to compile state data
and they have made some progress. These bodies deserve credit
for their initiatives, but these efforts appear to be in their early
stages. As indicated above, ECOS is the national body that coordinates state agency environmental efforts and conveys the
states’ positions to the federal government and the public,168
while the ECC is a collaborative effort among states to “improve
the effectiveness of their compliance and enforcement programs.”169 I reviewed the Web sites of each of these organizations, and I also contacted officials with each organization to ask
about compilations of state enforcement-related data and ways
to obtain such compilations, if they existed.170
ECOS has compiled state data once so far. The data in its 2001
report, State Environmental Agency Contributions to Enforcement and Compliance , has been called the “most complete information to date on state enforcement and compliance
activities,”171 despite obvious shortcomings, some of which
165

See supra note 160.
The Environmental Council of the States, at http://www.ecos.org (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005).
167 Environmental Compliance Consortium, at http://www.complianceconsortium.
org (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
168 The Environmental Council of the States, at http://www.ecos.org (last visited
Feb. 17, 2005).
169 Environmental Compliance Consortium, Linking States to Protect the Environment, at http://www.complianceconsortium.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
170 See E-mail from Mary Blakeslee, Deputy Director for Information Management, ECOS, to David L. Markell (Dec. 16, 2004, 17:33 EST) (on file with author);
E-mail from David L. Markell to ECOS (Dec. 16, 2004, 14:12 EST) (on file with
author); E-mail from David L. Markell to Shelley Metzenbaum, Executive Director,
Environmental Compliance Consortium (Dec. 6, 2004, 09:12 EST) (on file with
author).
171 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 24. The EPA
provided ECOS with funding support for this report. ECOS, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE (2001) (acknowledgements page).
166
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ECOS acknowledges.172 An ECOS official informed me that
ECOS currently is conducting another survey for information
covering 2000-2003, and it hopes to issue a new report in 2005.173
In terms of obtaining state-specific reports on enforcement and
compliance-related performance, the ECOS official indicated
that “[m]ost states have some type of publicly available report
but there is no easy way . . . to get that information.”174
The ECC appears to have more of an ongoing initiative to collect and present state compliance-related data than ECOS. The
ECC Web site provides a “State Environmental Information Portal” that enables the user to search by state and choose between
various reports, including compliance and enforcement reports.175 The following table is an effort to present the ECC’s
available enforcement and compliance reports from the states,
indicating which states provided reports in particular years. The
data was obtained by searching for “compliance and enforcement
reports” within the State Environmental Information Portal.176
While the ECC’s effort is an important and valuable step in increasing transparency of state information, it also seemingly reflects the distance that still needs to be traveled in order to create
a current, easily accessible “information infrastructure” for state
data. Fewer than twenty states have reports posted, and the
172 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 24 (noting that
the usefulness of the ECOS data was “limited because [the data from the different
states] are not comparable”). ECOS gathered the data by sending requests to states
for information. See ECOS, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 18 (2001).
173 E-mail from Mary Blakeslee, Deputy Director for Information Management,
ECOS, to David L. Markell (Dec. 16, 2004, 17:33 EST) (on file with author). The
EPA again is providing ECOS with funding support for this report. See The Environmental Council of the States, at http://www.ecos.org/section/projects/?id=1016.
174 E-mail from Mary Blakeslee, Deputy Director for Information Management,
ECOS, to David L. Markell (Dec. 16, 2004, 17:33 EST) (on file with author).
ECOS’s broad overview of EPA delegation of program authority to states is a helpful starting point in determining which states might be expected to prepare reports
on their enforcement activities, but it does not contain information concerning
which states are issuing enforcement reports. See The Environmental Council of
States, Enforcement, at http://www.ecos.org/section/states/enforcement (last visited
Dec. 16, 2004).
175 Environmental Compliance Consortium, State Environmental Information
Portal, at http://www.complianceconsortium.org/cgi-bin/StateReports.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
176 Policy statements, articles, and newsletters, which are included by the ECC in
its compliance and enforcement reports category were not included in the data. I
am especially grateful to Sarah Lindquist for developing this chart and to the Oregon Law Review staff for reviewing its contents.
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ECC officials were quite candid in discussing the limited value of
the data that the ECC had been able to collect from the states
and post on its Web site. The executive director indicated that,
for example, the information only indicates “how many states are
posting reports on-line in a location we could find, not how many
are producing environmental reports.”177 Similarly, the executive director highlighted the ad hoc nature of the ECC methodology—the ECC essentially did a one-time sweep of all state Web
sites and thereafter updates the portal when it runs across other
relevant state information on-line.178 As a result, the ECC portal
may not contain the most recent information. Some links to state
data are no longer active and more recent information for some
states is available at state department Web sites.179
TABLE 1
State

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

AL

Total
Rpts*
0

AK

X

1

AZ

0

AR

0

CA

0

CO
CT
DE

X

X

X

X

200103*

200103*

200103*

X

X

X

200103*

200103*

200103*

X**

4
7
3

FL

0

GA

0

HI

0

ID

0

IL

0

IN

0

IA

0

KS

0

KY

0

LA

0

ME

0

177 E-mail from Shelley Metzenbaum, Executive Director, Environmental Compliance Consortium, to David L. Markell (Dec. 7, 2004, 21:11 EST) (on file with
author).
178 Id.
179 See id.
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MD

X

X

X

X

X

5

MA

X

X

X

X

X**

5

MI

0

MN

0

MS

X

X

X

X

X

5

MO

0

MT

0

NE

0

NV

0

NH

0

NJ

X

X

X

X

X

X

NM

4
0

NY***
NC****

2

X

1

ND

0

OH

X

X

X

3

OK

0

OR*****

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X**

X

X

X

PA

5
0

RI

X

SC

5
X

3

SD

0

TN

0

TX******

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

UT
VT

4
0

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X**

8

VA

0

WA

X

1

WV

0

WI

0

WY
TOTALS

0
1

2

3

3

9

12

14

14

8

66

* Report covers years shown. Each year included was counted toward the total reports.
** Report was not shown on the ECC website but was found through the State’s own
Web site.
*** ECC’s link for the 2002 report is not active, the 2003 report is available at http://
www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dar/boss/ffy2003.html. One would assume there was, at
one time, a 2002 report but only current reports are kept at the NY Web site.
**** ECC only shows the 2000 report & notes that this is the 1st year NC compiled any
such report. One would assume this means there are reports for later years, but none
were found.
***** State Web site shows monthly reports starting in March of 2000.
****** ECC only shows the 2003 annual report & the monthly reports for 1998-2003.
At the TX Web site, there are monthly reports available from 1994 and annual reports
since at least 2001.
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A third possible approach to accountability and transparency,
seemingly less desirable and less accessible than either of the two
described above, would involve having enterprising citizens access relevant government files to compile their own reports on
state and federal enforcement-related performance. State versions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seemingly provide a mechanism for such an approach already.180 But the
experience of some citizen-initiated efforts of this sort in the
realm of state enforcement-related data suggests that citizens are
not likely to have smooth sailing in their quest to develop their
own reports from government-housed data. An April 2003 report reviewed the efforts of a prominent environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), the Environmental Integrity
Project (EIP),181 to obtain enforcement-related data from five
Midwestern states: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota.182 The EIP had a very difficult time obtaining the
data, as it reports:
EIP found that, in general, basic data on state actions that address significant violations of federal environmental law are
not readily available to the public . . . .
In many cases . . . citizens can only obtain the information
through laborious, file-by-file hand searches. Often these files
are scattered among state offices and can only be accessed by
citizens through time-consuming [FOIA] or comparable state
“sunshine” law requests. In addition, some states charge fees
for public information that extend well beyond the means of
the average citizen or non-profit organization.183

In sum, in terms of transparency and accountability, it should
not be a surprise that devolution, which inherently involves a
sharing of responsibility for program implementation, has the potential to undermine government accountability and trans180 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). For example, New York’s
Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) provides for access to state-held information
under various circumstances. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 2005); PATRICK J. BORCHERS & DAVID L. MARKELL, NEW YORK STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE & PRACTICE §§ 5.9-5.11 (West Publishing 2d ed. 1998).
181 ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, ASSESSING STATE ENFORCEMENT:
TOO MANY CLAIMS, TOO LITTLE DATA 2 (April 2003). Among other advantages
compared to at least some other NGOs, the EIP has support from the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, and its Executive Director is a former high-ranking EPA enforcement official. See ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, ABOUT EIP, at http://
www.environmentalintegrity.org/page1.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
182 ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 181, at 2.
183 Id.
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parency. As one commentator has noted, “[o]ne of the
hallmarks of third-party government is difficulty in achieving accountability of performance and results.”184 The purported advantages of a federal system (flexibility, competition, etc.) are
“accompanied by immense accountability and management
challenges.”185
Further, the intuitive truth that it is, and should be, easier for
the EPA to manage the data its regions generate than to manage
data from all of the states has proven all-too-true in practice.
While experience has shown that the EPA faces an enormous
challenge in developing and managing compliance-related data
compiled by its own offices,186 these challenges appear to be
magnified considerably by reliance on a federal regulatory structure that incorporates most of the fifty states as its primary implementers, but that lacks the mechanisms to collect, manage,
and disseminate state information effectively. The fact that, according to the EPA and ECOS, states are responsible for the
“collection and submission of [eighty-three to ninety-nine] percent of the environmental pollutant data contained in six key
EPA data systems [air pollution stationary sources, air pollution
ambient sources, drinking water, wastewater discharges, waterway quality, and hazardous waste],” and similarly conduct more
than eighty percent of all enforcement,187 raises the stakes in
terms of grappling with these data-related issues in order to enhance accountability and transparency in our cooperative federal
system.
The consequences have been disconcerting for those who are
interested in understanding what government is doing and the
results it is producing (i.e., in government transparency and accountability). As the NAPA panel concluded:
Most significantly, EPA and state data systems are hard to use
. . . for evaluating the environmental and compliance performance of individual facilities, groups of facilities, and responsible government agencies. As a result, Congress, EPA, state
agencies, state legislatures, and the public cannot readily eval184

FREDERICKSON, supra note 122, at 5; Behn, supra note 1, at 73.
FREDERICKSON, supra note 122, at 10. In the environmental arena, the architects and proponents of the recast state/federal partnership anticipated these concerns to some extent, highlighting the importance of accountable devolution.
186 See supra note 132.
187 ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL OF STATES & U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANT REPORTING DATA IN EPA’S NATIONAL SYSTEMS: DATA COLLECTION BY
STATE AGENCIES 1 (Sept. 30, 1999).
185
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uate the effectiveness, efficiency, or equity of state and EPA
enforcement and compliance assistance programs.188

There is the potential for improved data collection, reporting,
and dissemination to redress many of the problems discussed in
the text, and it is not my intention to paint an overly dismal picture of the complications that data management in our federal
system creates for government accountability and transparency.189 At a basic level, some of the key tasks are well understood. To quote the 2001 NAPA panel: “EPA and the states
should ensure the accuracy of the data . . . by standardizing definitions, adopting common data standards, developing compatible
data-sharing systems, and establishing consistency checks and
other automated systems that will minimize post-collection debates over accuracy.”190 Further, there are signs of significant
progress on many data-related fronts.191
However, despite these positive developments, the underlying
reality appears to be that our use of a cooperative federalism
model has had very real and significant costs in terms of the accountability and transparency of governance. The extent of devolution suggests that these costs will continue to be substantial
unless and until we more fully develop “federal agency capacity
to understand how to manage performance effectively in a federalist system,”192 and the related state will and capacity to operate
188 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 3. Other observers have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., U.S. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: EPA’S AND STATES’ EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS 6 GAO/RCED-98-113 (May 1998) (noting that “most of the
alternative [compliance] strategies GAO examined either were not being systematically evaluated or were still being assessed on the basis of outputs . . . rather than
results.”). The GAO identified the following as “key barriers” to program evaluation: (1) absence of baseline data; (2) difficulty of quantifying outcomes; and (3)
difficulty in establishing causal links. Id.
189 Some commentators, such as Professor Metzenbaum, have found that “[t]he
quality and quantity of information states provide the public has improved markedly
since 1995 [the onset of the NEPPS].” METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 20-21 (identifying the Illinois Fiscal Year 2001 self-assessment, and reports from Maryland,
Connecticut, and New Jersey as particularly good). To some extent, the question of
information dissemination is a half-empty/half-full issue. It is clear that some progress has been made, but it also is clear that much remains to be done, and devolution has complicated the challenge considerably.
190 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 24. There also
has been at least some progress in reaching agreement on other issues, such as the
question of what should be measured.
191 METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 52.
192 Id. In addition to collecting, managing, and disseminating state data, the EPA
also could add value by providing national analyses concerning priority compliance-
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as effective partners in this system.193
B. The EPA’s Expanding Enforcement Tool Box and Some
Potential Implications for Accountability
and Transparency
In recent years, the EPA has expanded its “tool box” for promoting compliance with the environmental laws in significant
ways. Traditionally, the EPA’s official policy for promoting compliance fit within what sometimes is characterized as a “deterrence-based” model. That is, the EPA sought to identify
significant violators and then pursued such violators through formal enforcement actions that sought to penalize the violators by
imposing sanctions that exceeded the economic benefit the violators reaped through non-compliance, while also requiring a
timely return to compliance.194 More recently, the EPA has substantially expanded its enforcement tool box to include a variety
of “compliance assistance” strategies (EPA initiatives to provide
educational and technical assistance, etc., that will facilitate compliance) as well as a menu of “compliance incentive” approaches
(initiatives that offer violators a variety of “carrots,” such as reduced penalties, including in some cases no penalty at all, in exchange for various “beyond compliance” and other commitments
by violators) in an effort to provide a more cooperative governrelated issues that require attention, and by providing data regarding successful initiatives that are worth replicating.
193 While many states have upgraded their capacity substantially in recent years,
significant gaps exist. See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68.
Devolution often is claimed to enhance transparency by making decision-making
more localized. See, e.g., id. at 33-34. One of my suggestions in this article is that
this oft-stated rationale for devolution may not hold in all contexts and deserves
more contextualized scrutiny than it sometimes receives.
194 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT]; U.S. EPA, Policy on Civil Penalties (Feb. 16, 1984). The reality
is considerably different from theory in the sense that the EPA has historically used
a blend of enforcement approaches that included formal enforcement actions, but
the agency also included forms of cooperation and a wide variety of informal strategies to promote compliance. See Rechtschaffen & Markell, supra note 68, at 81-83
(discussing “environmental enforcement as a hybrid”); Kagan et al., supra note 89,
at 65 (noting that “regulators tailor facility-level permits and informal orders to individual mills’ inputs, technologies, surrounding environmental exigencies, and investment cycles . . . . In no jurisdiction do regulations and regulators make all facilities
march exactly together, as in close order drill; rather, like cowboys during a long,
slow cattle drive, they prod a group of individuals in the same general direction.”).
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ment posture.195
This Part suggests that while there are many reasons to be optimistic about the promise of the “expanded tool box” approach,196 there are reasons to believe that this quite central
aspect of contemporary governance,197 like devolution, has the
potential to undermine government transparency and accountability. The mere increase in tools and approaches adds a layer of
complexity to governance that has the potential to increase accountability and transparency concerns.198 Further, the existence
of a variety of approaches offers secondary opportunities for reductions in accountability. For example, a regime with multiple
possible strategies for promoting compliance expands the potential for government officials to obfuscate—for instance, a government official, assailed for a putatively weak enforcement posture
because the “enforcement numbers” (cases brought, penalties
collected, etc.) are down, might seek to deflect this criticism by
pointing to the array of other enforcement tools being used, such
as compliance assistance, or compliance incentives policies that
forego penalties in exchange for certain other types of desired
regulated party behavior.199 Ferreting out the truth of such
claims may be quite difficult for the interested onlooker. In addition, as Professor David Dana and others have suggested200 the
character of many of the new tools is contractarian in nature; that
is, these tools seem potentially to increase the influence of regulated parties and diminish the role of interested members of the
public.201 Finally, while accountability and performance measures seemingly have the potential to ameliorate these concerns
195 See infra note 215; Paddock, supra note 64, at 244 (noting that the EPA has
turned to more compliance-based approaches); ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET
AL., supra note 56, at 19 (dividing compliance programs into four basic types: (1)
enforcement actions, (2) compliance assistance, (3) compliance incentives, and (4)
beyond-compliance incentives).
196 See infra Part II.B.2.
197 These types of developments do not appear to be unique to the EPA. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
198 Levine & Forrence, supra note 1, at 185 (noting that complexity can present
high information, monitoring, and organization costs and that such costs “create
‘slack,’ which shields officials from accountability to the general polity”); Daniel C.
Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1548-49
(1999) (suggesting that the risk of capture may be particularly great in the environmental arena because of the complexity of environmental regulation).
199 See supra note 95.
200 See, e.g., David A. Dana, The New ‘Contractarian’ Paradigm in Environmental
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35 (2000).
201 Id. at 52-57.
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(for example by providing information about government and
regulated party performance that enables the public to understand what government is doing and why, what it is accomplishing, and how the compliance behavior of regulated parties has
changed), existing measures of performance do not seem up to
the task at the present time of delivering accountability and
transparency to the degree needed to allay the preceding concerns. If anything, at least for the short term, the evolution in
performance measures paradoxically seems to have potential to
exacerbate accountability and transparency issues, to the extent
that reduced emphasis on activity measures is allowed without
sufficient progress in implementing outcome-based measures.202
In short, there are a variety of reasons why it is plausible that the
EPA’s expansion of its enforcement tool box may bring with it
significant potential to diminish accountability and transparency
in governance.
1. The Traditional Enforcement Tool Box
Traditionally, the EPA’s official policy for promoting compliance fit within what is sometimes characterized as a “deterrencebased” model.203 Key elements of this model included: (1) monitoring compliance by the regulated community; (2) identifying violations; and (3) pursuing timely and appropriate enforcement
actions against significant violators.204 The EPA has issued a series of documents over the past twenty or so years in which it has
202 See infra notes 258-61; U.S. EPA, MANAGING FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL
RESULTS: A TWO-YEAR ANNIVERSARY REPORT ON REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 EPA 100-R-97-004 (1997). The gap between desired and actual
levels of accountability and transparency, and the inadequacy of traditional measures in narrowing this gap, is a key reason why interest in new measures has been so
great.
203 See supra note 89.
204 See, e.g., U.S. GAO, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 120, at 4.
U.S. EPA, RCRA CIVIL PENALTY POLICY 5 (June 2003) (stating that its purposes
are to “ensure that RCRA civil penalties are assessed in a manner consistent with
Section 3008 [of RCRA]; that penalties are assessed in a fair and consistent manner;
that penalties are appropriate for the gravity of the violation committed; that economic incentives for noncompliance with RCRA requirements are eliminated; that
penalties are sufficient to deter persons from committing RCRA violations; and that
compliance is expeditiously achieved and maintained”).

The term “significant violators” is a term of art. See infra note 207. The EPA does
not pursue the vast majority of violators through formal enforcement actions. Instead, it uses a variety of strategies, such as warning letters, to try to promote compliance without the need for formal enforcement. See RECHTSCHAFFEN &
MARKELL, supra note 68, at 64.
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articulated and elaborated upon the details of its approach to deterrence-based enforcement. In its 1992 Principles of Environmental Enforcement , for example, the EPA outlines what it
considers to be four key elements of an effective enforcement
program: “(1) There is a good chance violations will be detected;
(2) The response to violations will be swift and predictable; (3)
The response will include an appropriate sanction; and (4) Those
subject to requirements perceive that the first three factors are
present.”205
The EPA has developed a variety of strategies to implement
this four-part framework. For example, the agency established
protocols for conducting various types of inspections.206 The
agency has similarly established guidelines concerning the types
of violations that warrant formal enforcement action, as well as
guidelines concerning the types of sanctions that are appropriate.207 The EPA’s definitions of “timely and appropriate” enforcement activity are important elements of this framework.208
205 U.S. EPA, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 194, at
2-3; Michael Stahl, Beyond the Bean Count: Measuring Performance of Regulatory
Compliance Programs, 28 THE PUB. MANAGER 31 (1999); Kagan et al., supra note
89, at 61 (noting that under this deterrence model firms “abate environmental impacts only as required to by law and when they believe that noncompliance might be
detected and penalized”). Research suggests that the United States tends to be
more deterrence-oriented than many other countries, including Canada. Kathryn
Harrison, The Regulator’s Dilemma: Regulation of Pulp Mill Effluents in the Canadian Federal State, 24 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 3 (1996) (finding that United States
officials enforced their regulations more legalistically and required more frequent
penalties than their Canadian counterparts, and that compliance was better in the
United States); Kagan et al., supra note 89, at 62-63 (noting that “pulp and paper
officials at a corporation with mills in Canada and the United States contrasted the
‘enforcement frenzy’ in the United States with the partnering approach regulatory
officials took in Canada” while finding “no consistent difference among regulatory
jurisdictions in the environmental performance of pulp mills”). As is suggested below, the United States is by no means monolithic in its approach. RECHTSCHAFFEN
& MARKELL, supra note 68, at 149; Kagan, et al., supra note 89, at 62-63, n.18 (noting a contrast between the approaches and attitudes of state and federal officials).
206 EPA has also developed “Environmental Audit Protocols” that are intended
to assist regulated parties with conducting their own environmental audits. See, e.g.,
U.S. EPA, PROTOCOL FOR CONDUCTING ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITS
FOR MUNICIPAL FACILITIES UNDER U.S. EPA’S WASTEWATER REGULATIONS
(2000).
207 See, e.g., OIG SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 31 (noting that the EPA’s
various enforcement policies identify the most significant violators, and that most
policies call these regulated entities “significant non-compliers,” except for the air
program, which calls them high priority violators. The OIG also notes that the “exact criteria for significant non-compliers vary with each statute.”); U.S. EPA, RCRA
CIVIL PENALTY POLICY 5 (June 2003).
208 For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see, for example, RECHTSCHAF-
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The EPA has traditionally taken the position that for significant
violations that warrant enforcement action (and the EPA has defined significant violations under its various statutory
schemes),209 a penalty should be recovered that requires the violator to disgorge the economic benefit it gained from its violations. The EPA, in the words of one commentator, “has made
the recapture or disgorgement of this financial gain—or ‘economic benefit’—a cornerstone of its civil penalty policy for environmental enforcement.”210 In addition, the EPA’s policies also
require the violator to pay an additional amount as a penalty so
that the violator is in a worse financial position than a regulated
party that met its environmental obligations.211 The EPA refers
to this additional component as the “gravity” component of a
penalty.212
The primary goals of a deterrence-based model include: (1)
specific deterrence—the specific violator pursued through an enforcement action will learn its lesson and not violate again; and
(2) general deterrence—other regulated parties will take heed of
the government’s enforcement presence and activity and will be
more likely to comply with their legal obligations as a result.213
This model is based on the theory that regulated parties are rational economic actors and, as a result, the goal of enforcement
agencies is to “make penalties high enough and the probability of
detection great enough that it becomes economically irrational
for regulated entities to violate the law.”214
The EPA has lauded its deterrence-based approach on numerous occasions over the years. In a 1995 article entitled Enforce& MARKELL, supra note 68, at 100-03; see also U.S. EPA, POLICY ON CIVIL
PENALTIES (Feb. 16, 1984); U.S. EPA, REVISED INTERIM CLEAN WATER ACT SETTLEMENT PENALTY POLICY, 25 ELR 35618 (Mar. 1, 1995).
209 For the EPA’s definition of “significant violation” see, for example, U.S. EPA,
OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR AN INTEGRATED EPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 5 (1996) [hereinafter EPA OPERATING PRINCIPLES];
see also sources cited supra note 207.
210 Jonathan S. Shefftz, EPA’s Economic Benefit Analysis Policy and Practice ,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 74 (Fall 2004). There has been considerable debate
about how best to calculate economic benefit. This debate has raised a host of interesting questions, but these questions are beyond the scope of this article. Id.
211 See, e.g., EPA REVISED POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 139. For an in-depth
discussion of this framework, see RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at
98-108.
212 See, e.g., EPA REVISED POLICY FRAMEWORK, supra note 139.
213 RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 60.
214 Id.
FEN
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ment in Transition, Michael Stahl, then an EPA Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the EPA’s enforcement office, summarized the
EPA’s views about the benefits of the deterrence-based model:
Over the last quarter century, enforcement based on deterrence has been a critical factor in motivating business toward
environmentally responsible behavior. Through rigorous inspection, detection of violations, and the resulting sanctions
and penalties, companies are forced to correct violations and
discouraged from future noncompliance . . . .

This level of deterrence-based enforcement activity has provided
a strong source of motivation for regulated entities. Fear of enforcement action and its attendant public embarrassment has
caused many companies and facilities to move into compliance.
Deterrence has prevented many noncomplying parties from gaining an unfair competitive advantage over those who comply.
And it has helped drive the application of technologies that can
improve business performance and profitability. Deterrence will
always have an important role in environmental protection.215
2. Expansion of the Enforcement Tool Box in Recent Years
Although agency officials have continued to highlight the importance of a deterrence-based enforcement presence, in recent
years the EPA has evinced increasing willingness to depart from
its traditional deterrence-based approach, or at least to expand
its enforcement tool box to include other strategies intended to
promote compliance.216 Indeed, in the mid-1990s the EPA significantly revamped the structure of its enforcement office, in part
because of its desire to pursue a more flexible, and more integrated, approach to its environmental enforcement and compliance work.217 In his 1995 Transition article, EPA’s Stahl noted
215 Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in Transition, THE ENVTL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec.
1995, at 19. For similar views from a former head of the EPA’s enforcement office,
see Steven A. Herman, NCSL Study Finds that State Environmental Audit Laws
Have no Impact on Company Self Auditing, and Disclosure of Violations, NAT’L
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Dec. 1998-Jan. 1999, at 18; Steven A. Herman, EPA’s FY
1997 Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Priorities , NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Feb. 1997, at 3-5.
216 EPA OPERATING PRINCIPLES, supra note 209; Paddock, supra note 64, at 244
(noting that “environmental agencies have increasingly turned to more collaborative
methods of assuring compliance”); see also id. at 248 (noting that “[g]overnment
agencies have, in the last few years, begun to use a ‘systems approach’ for their
enforcement and compliance programs”).
217 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE EPA ENFORCEMENT REORGANIZATION TASK
FORCE, INTEGRATED ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES FOR EPA (Sept. 1, 1993); EPA
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that:
[E]nforcement is moving beyond its adversarial and antagonistic beginnings. For the past several years, practitioners of environmental enforcement, from Washington to state capitals to
city halls, have begun to transform their philosophy and methods, redefining the roles of government, business, and the public in ensuring environmental compliance and thereby
improving environmental protection.218

Mr. Stahl summarized some of the key reasons for the EPA’s
decision to use a more integrated approach to enforcement. He
noted that: (1) deterrence is “largely reactive” in that its focus is
on identifying and addressing violations after they occur – it prevents future violations “only as a by-product rather than through
proactive approaches;”219 (2) its focus largely is on punishment
(sticks) and is incomplete because it does not offer carrots to encourage desired behavior because it does not focus on “enhancing or rewarding voluntary compliance”;220 and (3) it is
increasingly clear that the “full coverage” paradigm on which it
purportedly is founded (i.e., complete coverage of the regulated
universe and “uniform enforcement of the law”) is an “unattainable ideal” because of the size of the regulated community universe and limited government resources.221
In his Transition article, Mr. Stahl identified use of a more diverse set of tactics as a key element of the EPA’s effort to transform its approach to enforcement. Mr. Stahl highlighted
OPERATING PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 2. The EPA changed the name of its
Office of Enforcement to the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
(OECA) as part of its effort to demonstrate its plan to pursue a wider range of
compliance-promotion approaches. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68,
at 160. The EPA’s decision to recast itself has not taken place in a vacuum. For
support for changes of this sort, see, for example, MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE
REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING
COMPLIANCE 132 (2000); LeRoy Paddock & Suellen Keiner, Mixing Management
Metaphors: The Complexities of Introducing a Performance-Based State/EPA Partnership System into an Activity-Based Management Culture, (2000) at http://www.
napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/epafile11.pdf.
218 Stahl, supra note 215, at 19.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. Mr. Stahl also asserts that a problem with deterrence-based enforcement is
that the “definition of success tends to devolve to counting activities (the number of
enforcement actions taken or penalty dollars collected)” rather than paying attention to environmental protection and that this leads to confusion over ends and
means. Id. There are significant questions, at least in my view, about the merits of
this concern, at least conceptually, but there is no need to address this issue in this
article.
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“compliance assistance” strategies intended to “prevent violations,” “compliance incentive” programs intended to “encourage
and facilitate responsible behavior,” and “programs to recognize
excellence in environmental management.”222 Over the past decade, the EPA has initiated a large variety of new initiatives that
fit into one or more of these categories as part of its effort to
move toward an “integrated compliance system,”223 or towards
what the EPA has characterized as “a smart enforcement” framework.224 These include the Agency’s Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) Policy;225 its “Self-Audit” Policy;226 its Small
Business and Small Local Government compliance policies;227
and its Performance Track program.228 We are into our second
or third generation or iteration of some of these initiatives as the
EPA has refined them over time.229
Experimentation with a variety of strategies to promote compliance seems to be a particularly sensible strategy in a context
such as compliance-promotion, which is characterized by signifi222 Id. Mr. Stahl also mentions “affirmative use of compliance data to inform the
public about environmental performance of companies or facilities.” Id.; see also
EPA OPERATING PRINCIPLES, supra note 209, at 3 (discussing “compliance assistance” and “compliance incentive” approaches).
223 Stahl, supra note 215, at 19, 20-21. NAPA and the ELI have observed that
these initiatives have proliferated. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra
note 56, at 2 (“Over the past several years, state compliance assistance services . . .
and initiatives promoting beyond-compliance behaviors have proliferated.”).
224 U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, Goal 5, p.1. The EPA defines “smart enforcement” as “the use of the most appropriate enforcement or compliance tools to address the most significant problems to achieve the greatest impact
for environmental protection.” Id.
225 See supra notes 59-63.
226 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention
of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000).
227 Small Business Compliance Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,630 (Apr. 11, 2000) (the
EPA initially issued this Policy in 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 27,984 (June 3, 1996), modified
it in 1999, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,116 (July 29, 1999), and then revised it again in 2000);
Small Local Governments Compliance Assistance Policy, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,278 (June
2, 2004). The EPA called its initial effort to develop a special compliance policy for
small governments its “Policy on Flexible State Enforcement Responses to Small
Community Violations.” 67 Fed. Reg. 3185-01 (Jan. 23, 2002).
228 National Environmental Performance Track Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,737-01
(Apr. 22, 2004). Performance Track is an initiative that the EPA launched in 2000
and as of the issuance of EPA’s second annual progress report in 2004, included 344
members and was intended to “recognize[ ] and reward[ ] facilities that consistently
exceed regulatory requirements, work closely with their communities, and excel in
protecting the environment and public health.” U.S. EPA, PERFORMANCE TRACK
SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT: BUILDING ON THE FOUNDATION 3 (2004).
229 This is true for the EPA’s Self-Auditing policy, the SEPs policy, and the Small
Business Compliance policy, among others. See supra notes 59, 226-27.
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cant uncertainty about the relative effectiveness of different approaches.230 Nevertheless, with a multiplicity of approaches
come opportunities for internal confusion about how best to
match means to ends, as well as challenges in monitoring performance. Furthermore, it becomes potentially more complicated for the public to understand what government is doing and
accomplishing.
The “contractarian” nature of many of the new tools in EPA’s
tool box, to borrow a term that Professor David Dana has
used,231 has the potential to exacerbate accountability and transparency concerns. Professor Dana characterizes a contractarian
approach as consisting of “deals” in which “regulators contractually commit not to enforce some requirements that are formally
applicable to the regulated entities in return for the regulated
entities’ contractual commitments to take measures not required
under existing formal law.”232 For purposes of this article, I define the contractarian approach more broadly to also include
deals in which regulators contractually commit to more mild
forms of enforcement, like reduced penalties, in exchange for various types of commitments by regulated parties.233
230 Kagan et al., supra note 89, at 53 (suggesting that enforcement and compliance
policy makers and others operate in a context in which there is enormous uncertainty about what works best: “We still know little about why individual corporations behave the way they do in the environmental context, or why some companies
but not others choose to move beyond compliance, or what social policy tools are
likely to prove most effective in achieving improved corporate environmental performance.”); Paddock, supra note 64, at 244-45; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
ET AL., supra note 56, at 17; RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68. In the
interest of full disclosure, I endorsed experiments with different approaches to environmental governance in the compliance/enforcement arena, among others, a decade ago. See States as Innovators, supra note 100. Experiments within the context
of an “adaptive management” approach that has the capacity to track such experiments and the results they produce, and to adapt accordingly, would seem to be
particularly useful. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38
IDAHO L. REV. 385, 402-03 (2002) (describing an “adaptive management framework”). Objective and ongoing program assessment, including viable outcome-focused (performance) measurement, would seem to be a key feature for maximizing
the benefit of such experiments.
231 Dana, supra note 200, at 52-57.
232 Id. at 36. Professor Dana ascribes the increasing popularity of a “contractarian” approach to governance to “perceived failings in substantive environmental regulation.” Id. He suggests that political divisions have led to paralysis in
changing a substantially flawed environmental regulatory infrastructure that is
overly complex and rigid, and that contractarian regulation has emerged as a result.
Id.
233 As discussed above, the EPA and many states have adopted a number of policies that authorize such contractarian arrangements.
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For our purposes, an important feature of such contractarian
regulation is that it is “highly decentralized and contextualized.”234 The efficiencies that such regulation seeks to produce
are achieved through “case-by-case negotiations and agreements
between regulators and the regulated.”235 Professor Dana described the EPA’s contractarian strategies as programs that
“principally rely on highly particularized, do-it-this-way requirements—requirements that might be dubbed ‘negotiate and control’ rather than ‘command and control.’”236 Professor Dana
voices the concern that this potential “genuine paradigm shift in
American environmental regulation” from command and control
regulation to contractarian regulation may “entail[ ] greater participation and monitoring costs for environmentalists than does
more centralized, command-and-control-style regulation.”237 In
other words, he suggests that this potential paradigm shift in approaches to regulation may have the consequence, unintended or
not, of reducing accountability and transparency in governance.
This reduction in accountability may manifest itself in at least
three ways. First, regulated parties may gain additional leverage
over the disposition of cases.238 Second, regulators may gain additional discretion to address cases as they believe appropriate—
234

Id. at 37.
Id.
236 Id. Conventional environmental regulation has been subject to an enormous
amount of criticism for being inflexible. The oft-used term is “command and control” regulation. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227, 1235-41 (1995).
237 Dana, supra note 200, at 37-38. Jim Salzman and J.B. Ruhl have suggested
that increased use of trading approaches has implications for agency/applicant discretion in the context of habitat protection negotiations under the Endangered Species Act, and that environmental groups have complained about lack of public
participation in such processes. James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 683-87 (2000). See
also Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms , 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267,
1271-73, 1281-84, 1301, 1323 (1985) (asserting that uniform standards are likely more
effective than fine-tuned approaches because of advantages of the former, including:
1) “decreased information collection and evaluation costs;” 2) “greater accessibility
of decisions to public scrutiny and participation;” and 3) “reduced opportunities for
obstructive behavior by regulated parties”).
238 Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is Enforcement
Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327 (2004). Some strategies may shift
the balance by increasing the monitoring expectations for regulated entities and lead
government to reduce or shift its own monitoring resources. While there are good
reasons for such shifts, including government resource constraints, there are risks as
well. See METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 11.
235
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the surfeit of options may provide additional insulation from
public oversight or scrutiny.239 Third, as indicated above, there is
the possibility that the expanded tool box will reduce accountability in the sense that it will relieve pressure on regulators to
produce traditional results.240 Because of these possible consequences, Professor Dana and others have suggested that contractarian approaches are likely to benefit the regulated
community and have the potential to disenfranchise the interested public, at least to some degree.241 The ELI, among others,
239 As Professor Robert Kuehn and others have noted, government officials already possess enormous discretion in determining the appropriate enforcement response under a traditional deterrence-based scheme; for example, whether to
enforce, the size of penalty to demand and settle for, and the type of injunctive relief
that is required. Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2387 (1996). Thus, one question for
further research that the breadth of discretion in this context (i.e., the degree of
“decentralization” and “contextualization”) naturally raises involves the extent to
which, if at all, empowering government enforcers to select from a more extensive
tool box extends that discretion in a meaningful way. The efforts that the EPA made
in the early 1990s to require its staff to document their enforcement approaches in
individual enforcement cases would probably be relevant to this analysis. See, e.g.,
U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP REVIEW ON EPA’S MITIGATION OF
PENALTIES, Report No. E1GMG4-05-6009-4400107 (Sept. 15, 1994) (finding improvements in the EPA’s documentation of penalties, among other things).
240 See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
241 Dana, supra note 200, at 52, 53 (suggesting that the “content of contractarian
regulation may be more in tune with the . . . agenda of regulated entities than with
the agenda of environmentalists.” And “[i]t may well be more difficult for environmentalists and environmentally oriented citizens to influence the formation of contractarian environmental regulation than it is for them to influence the formation of
command-and-control environmental regulation.”); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control ,
22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 144 (1998) (raising similar concerns regarding the
EPA’s Project XL initiative); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation & Constraints on Agency Regulation, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999) (suggesting that “[a]s regulators’ discretion increases, so does the potential for special
interest groups to influence agency policy.”); Rechtschaffen, supra note 238, at 1353
(suggesting that “providing regulators with additional enforcement discretion could
exacerbate the already-existing tendency toward special interest influence or domination.”). While citizen suits, expanded standing, and judicial “hard look” review
have been posited as mechanisms to reduce risks of capture, these oversight mechanisms might not always be available in the EPA’s expanded tool box. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that standing should be expanded to offset “capture”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 128 n.239, 129 (1994) (discussing “hard
look” review as a way to mitigate concerns about agency capture); Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 163, 183-84 (1992) (noting that courts highlighted the concern that agencies
were “captured”); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforce-
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has asserted that, more generally, governance via “expanded tool
boxes” requires a heightened commitment to accountability and
transparency compared to more simple systems of governance:
“[b]eyond the general principle of public accountability, integrated compliance demands a particularly high level of openness
and public involvement. Transparency is essential to building
public confidence in an agency and in the performance of regulated facilities.”242
This ELI sentiment concerning the need for enhanced accountability and transparency in a regulatory environment that involves multiple compliance-promotion options raises the
question of whether, at least conceptually, an improved (including a more open and transparent) accountability or performance
measures regime might help to ameliorate accountability concerns stemming from an expanded EPA tool box that contains
several “contractarian” tools. Therefore, it is seemingly propitious that renewed interest in improving accountability regimes
has emerged concurrently with heightened interest in expanding
government tool boxes. The enactment of the GPRA is only the
tip of the iceberg in terms of the interest in strengthening performance measures in order to enhance government accountability, in the environmental arena among others.243
ment: Cooperation, Capture and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 83-84 (2002)
(noting that the risks of capture are particularly high in environmental enforcement
context and one reason why Congress created citizen suit provisions).
242 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 25. In his article, A
Manifesto for the Radical Middle, J.B. Ruhl suggests that increased transparency in
government decision-making may justify limiting public participation in contractarian types of arrangements. Ruhl, supra note 230, at 404-05.
243 See, e.g., SHELLEY METZENBAUM, MAKING MEASUREMENT MATTER: THE
CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF BUILDING A PERFORMANCE-FOCUSED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (Brookings Inst. Center for Public Management 1998);
Stahl, supra note 215; GPRA, supra note 139, § (2)(b)(1) (providing that one of the
purposes of the act is to “improve the confidence of the American people in the
capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding Federal agencies
accountable for achieving program results”); FREDERICKSON, supra note 122, at 5
(noting that “[a]ccountability is one of GPRA’s central objectives”). Implementation of the GPRA is still relatively new. Id. at 6 (noting that, although it became law
in 1993, government-wide implementation did not begin until 1997). Further, while
nearly all federal agencies rely on third parties to carry out their work, “there is no
systematic approach to managing federal programs in which third parties play significant roles.” Id. at 4; METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 11. Nevertheless, at least
some commentators suggest that the GPRA has had some successes. FREDERICKSON, supra note 122, at 4. Further, at least one observer suggests that “GPRA can
lead to improvements in the relationship between federal agencies and the third
parties they oversee or with whom they collaborate to produce public services.” Id.
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The EPA and the states have made a concerted effort in recent
years to move from an accountability system that focused primarily on government activities toward a performance-based or results-based approach to management.244 Traditionally, the EPA
and the states focused primarily on measuring inputs (the level of
government activity devoted to enforcement, such as numbers of
work years) and outputs (the number of government actions,
such as inspections, enforcement actions initiated, penalties collected, and the like).245 In recent years, there has been a push to
emphasize “outcome” or other measures more directly related to
results—measures, such as compliance rates, which purport to
demonstrate the impact of different enforcement and compliance
activities.246 The NAPA panel, for example, notes “the states’
interest in focusing on compliance rates rather than the numbers
of enforcement cases initiated.”247
There is good reason for expanding performance measures to
include measures that provide information on outcomes, as numerous observers have noted. Professor William Gormley, for
example, commented that “[o]utputs do not tell policymakers or
managers whether progress has been made towards achieving an
agency’s stated goals. At worst, ‘bean-counting’ becomes an end
in itself, with outputs or ‘beans’ displacing statutory goals as values to be maximized. This is highly dysfunctional.”248
at 8. Mr. Frederickson urges federal agencies to “use GPRA as the vehicle through
which federal agencies expand their monitoring activities to include the universe of
third-party relationships.” He offers a number of recommendations on how to advance this goal. Id. at 25-27 (suggesting that the OMB should require that agencies
include information on third party collaboration).
244 See, e.g., GPRA, supra note 139; see also METZENBAUM, supra note 98, at 2021 (summarizing recent development in the EPA and state relationship that emphasizes outcome indicators for performance rather than the process).
245 See supra note 99; EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121,
at 10 (noting that “[t]he primary accountability mechanism used by Congress and
EPA [for the states] has . . . been counting activities that states provide for EPA’s
media-specific databases, such as numbers of permits, inspections, enforcement actions, and penalty dollars.”); JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH
STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 119 (1995) (noting that “EPA’s . . . system for evaluating the successfulness of its enforcement work is based on a set of numerical indicators. EPA officials keep a record of the number of administrative orders, civil
referrals, and criminal referrals issued or made by the agency over the course of a
fiscal year, as well as the total amounts of administrative and civil penalties it has
assessed against environmental violators.”).
246 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 10.
247 Id. at 27.
248 Id. at 12 (quoting Professor William Gormley). The NAPA panel offered a
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There has also been some progress in expanding accountability
measures so that such measures provide information about the
outcomes of government performance, as well as information
about the nature and level of government activities.249 Further,
the EPA has reported increased use of outcome measures in recent years.250
But, at least in the short term, there are reasons to believe that
the burgeoning industry of performance measurement is unlikely
to be a panacea that will fully ameliorate concerns about government accountability and transparency. As experience has shown,
the move to a performance-based approach is not likely to be
seamless, but instead is likely to encounter numerous pitfalls. To
identify a few of the challenges that are inherent in moving to
similar perspective concerning the challenges the EPA faces in the performance
measures realm:
The data systems that currently support EPA and state compliance and enforcement programs are focused almost exclusively on counting types of
enforcement actions, compliance assistance initiatives, and other regulatory
activities . . . . [T]he information provides little insight into how EPA and
state enforcement and compliance initiatives contribute to improving environmental quality, increasing compliance with regulatory requirements, or
producing regulatory fairness across industries, among states, and within
communities. As a result, Congress, EPA, state agencies, state regulations,
the regulatory community, and the public cannot readily assess the effectiveness, efficiency, or fairness of federal and state environmental
programs.
Id. at 26.
249 See, e.g., Memorandum from U.S. EPA & ECOS, to Senior Environmental
Protection Agency Officials & Senior State Environmental Officials (Aug. 20, 1997)
(on file with author) (Joint Statement between the EPA & ECOS reaffirming state
and EPA “commitment to use core performance measures as tools to track progress
in achieving environmental results”); cf. ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY PROJECT, ASSESSING STATE ENFORCEMENT: TOO MANY CLAIMS, TOO LITTLE DATA, supra note
181, at 3 (suggesting that the paradoxical “perfect is the enemy of the good” phenomenon may be undermining progress: “We have reached the point where the
search for a consensus behind an ideal set of performance measures for state and
federal environmental agencies has been used to justify postponing good practices
that could be put into place today.”).
250 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, ch. 6 at 2 (noting
that “[a]gency efforts in FY 2003 increased the percentage of the Agency’s annual
goals and measures that focus on environmental outcomes”); OIG SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 128, at 22-23 (noting that the EPA’s Criminal Investigative Division
[CID] began using additional enforcement measures in 2003, notably aggregate
amounts of pollution reduced or curtailed as a result of criminal proceedings, which
the CID apparently began to collect in 2000 and 2001, but which it found were sufficiently reliable beginning in FY 2002 to include in the annual performance reports);
EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 13 (noting that
OECA has attempted to capture some outcomes in its “Core Enforcement
Measures”).
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such a new system,251 new measures need to be agreed upon,252
complexities inherent in the measures themselves need to be addressed,253 strategies for monitoring performance in light of the
new measures need to be developed and implemented,254 and decisions need to be made about how to integrate such data into
existing data reporting schemes.255
The ELI’s 2003 report on enforcement reflects the “in progress” nature of the effort to expand performance measures in
order to enhance accountability.256 The report notes a widely
held “lack of confidence” in state performance in the compliance
realm and suggests that this lack of confidence in part “may . . .
reflect [state agencies’] failure to obtain data for measuring
whether new compliance initiatives are producing improved environmental results . . . .”257 The report points out that, for example, while states have
[C]ommitted significant resources to compliance assistance . . .
[u]nfortunately, the effectiveness of the states’ compliance assistance efforts is simply measured by numbers of contacts
with the regulated community. Instead, given the large
amount of resources dedicated to these programs in all five
states, more robust ways of determining the value of various
approaches to compliance assistance need to be developed.258
251 For discussions of these challenges, see METZENBAUM, supra note 243; Stahl,
supra note 215. An expansive body of literature has grown up around the issue of
performance measurement. The purpose of this discussion is limited to attempting
to highlight some of the issues that shifting to a new performance-based system may
raise in terms of government accountability.
252 See EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 27.
253 See, e.g., infra notes 263-64 regarding compliance rates.
254 In some cases this is likely to be a significant challenge because the variety of
government activities has expanded. Measuring the impact of such changes is likely
to be difficult and potentially resource-intensive. See, e.g., Peter J. May, Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The Saga of Leaky Buildings , 25 L.
& POL’Y 381, 392-95 (Oct. 2003) (noting that it sometimes can be “prohibitively
costly to develop accurate monitoring technology for gauging performance”).
255 See supra Part II.A. regarding the challenges associated with managing reporting schemes more generally.
256 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56.
257 Id. at 4.
258 Id. at 6. The 2001 NAPA panel is of the same view:
[W]hen states identified the measures they used to “calculate success of
compliance [assistance] programs for the time period 1995-1999,” the most
common was on-site visits. This indicator has two problems. First, the
number of visits provides little information about how these visits really
affected compliance, much less how they affected environmental outcomes.
Second, the number of visits reported relative to the number of regulated
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ELI concludes that “[a]ll five states lack meaningful measures
for evaluating the effectiveness of their compliance assistance
programs in terms of pollution reduced or other environmental
outcomes. The most common measure—number of contacts
with the regulated community—provides little information about
the efficacy of compliance assistance initiative efforts.”259
The ELI reached similar conclusions concerning the states’
leadership programs for high performers: “All five states lack
useful data on the environmental outcomes produced by their
voluntary leadership programs.”260 The EPA’s Office of Inspector General similarly has found that the “EPA lacks outcome
measures that would allow EPA and others to evaluate the environmental results achieved.”261
Many states, among other parties, have identified compliance
rates as one of the best measures (and perhaps the best measure)
of enforcement performance. NAPA, for example, found that
the “EPA and the states believe that compliance rates could be
an important measure of program success . . . .”262 Yet, the calculation of such rates in a credible way is a significant challenge.
NAPA, like many others, has noted that “calculating compliance
rates is a difficult task.”263 NAPA concluded that “far more work
facilities suggests that the compliance program applies to a small sub-set of
the regulated universe.
EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 27-28.
259 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE ET AL., supra note 56, at 63.
260 Id. at 64. The challenges associated with an expanded tool box in the cooperative federalism context extend well beyond performance measures to include planning and implementation as well. ELI found in its five state study that there is a
significant divide between the way in which states should implement an integrated
compliance approach and current operations. For example, ELI concluded that
states should rely on a “broad range of compliance tools, including technical and
compliance assistance, enforcement, and leadership programs” and that in “deciding
when to deploy these tools, states need an integrated strategy that first identifies key
environmental problems and then enables managers to select the tool or tools best
suited to solving the problems.” Id. at 68. ELI’s conclusion was that “these five
states are only beginning to develop such integrated compliance programs.” Id.
261 OIG SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 11; Paddock, supra note 64, at 24950 (suggesting that the EPA has failed to put into place measures of performance
that monitor the results of its arsenal of approaches in a timely and accurate way).
The EPA reports that its use of outcome measures has increased in recent years.
See, e.g., U.S. EPA, FISCAL YEAR 2003 ANNUAL REPORT ch. 6 at 2 (noting that
“[a]gency efforts in FY 2003 increased the percentage of the Agency’s annual goals
and measures that focus on environmental outcomes”).
262 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 27.
263 Id. The NAPA panel elaborates on the difficulty of determining compliance
rates as follows:

\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-1\ORE101.txt

“Slack” in the Administrative State

unknown

Seq: 63

31-OCT-05

11:22

63

needs to be done on refining the definitions of data elements and
developing a method for calculating compliance rates before using them as a reliable indicator of program effectiveness.”264
Further, another detail of implementation that will likely influence the efficacy of new measures involves the extent to which
the rush to these new measures comes at the expense of retention
of traditional measures. I discuss above some of the significant
challenges involved with effectively managing data relating to existing measures of performance.265 The question here is whether
new measures will result in less attention to “getting traditional
measures right.” Some states, among other parties, have objected to having to do both—to having to collect and report outcome and other performance-based data in addition to their
traditional obligation to do the same for activity data.266 Further,
some parties have asserted that traditional enforcement outputs
Compliance rates are notoriously difficult to calculate . . . because they rely
on a number of data elements that must be explicitly and consistently defined . . . . [The] EPA and the states believe that compliance rates could be
an important measure of program success, but far more work needs to be
done on refining the definitions of data elements and developing a method
for calculating compliance rates before using them as a reliable indicator of
program effectiveness. It is important that the EPA and the states work
both separately and together on developing more rigorous, reliable, and
uniform approaches to calculating and comparing compliance rates.
Id. NAPA’s characterization of the ECOS report discussed above, see EVALUATING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 24, seems to reflect considerable
skepticism of the ECOS findings:
[T]he ECOS report purports to show that almost half the state programs
responding to the survey achieved compliance rates between 90 and 100
percent. Although this information is useful in understanding the states’
views of compliance rates, it does not indicate whether any of the states
have overcome the obstacles noted above or whether they have found a
reliable method of calculating accurate compliance rates.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Tiffin Shewmake, Calculating and Communicating
Environmental Compliance Rates, ECOSTATES 23 (Spring 2003), available at http://
www.complianceconsortium.org/ECCAuthored/ComplianceRateArticle.pdf (noting
that “[t]he idea of using compliance rates . . . is conceptually simple and appealing.
Despite the obvious appeal, surprisingly few states routinely generate compliance
rates for most of their programs. Nor does the Environmental Protection Agency
do so.”). Ms. Shewmake, assistant director of the Environmental Compliance Consortium (ECC), reports that the ECC and individual states have made progress in
developing better ways to calculate and use compliance rates. Id.; Tiffin Shewmake,
Using Compliance Rates to Manage, ECOSTATES 17 (Fall 2004).
264 EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 27. As noted
above, progress is occurring on this front. Tiffin Shewmake, Using Compliance
Rates to Manage, ECOSTATES 17 (Fall 2004).
265 See supra Part II.A.
266 See RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68, at 187.
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provide little meaningful information about the efficacy of government efforts to promote compliance. ECOS, for example, has
asserted that output data answer the wrong question, or at least
do not answer the right question – that is, substantively, any
drop-off in the level of enforcement activity is of little import
because it is not at all clear that the number of enforcement actions “actually reveals anything of value about the environment.”267 There is probably also resistance to maintaining
“output” data because of concerns about underlying
performance.268
In short, there is reason to believe that to be effective, performance-based management needs to be implemented in a way
that makes sense in light of this contextual reality.269 Figure 1
reflects the additional challenges that expanding tools and new
measures pose for the EPA and the states. Traditionally, the
EPA’s focus was limited to data within Box A, while its current
focus has been substantially expanded to include data that fit
within any of the four parts of the figure. Given the challenges
that the EPA has faced in “getting Box A right,” the heightened
challenges it faces in this new regulatory landscape of expanded
tools and additional measures are obvious.
FIGURE 1
A
Traditional Strategies/Traditional
Measures

B
Traditional Strategies/New
Measures

C
New Strategies/Traditional
Measures

D
New Strategies/New Measures

267

EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 121, at 17.
See generally RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 68.
269 See Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 512-26 (noting, for example, that whether accountability improves decision-making depends on the context). It is by no means
certain that expanding performance measures will result in insufficient attention to
activity-based measures. Performance measure experts recommend interpreting activity data in the context of outcome data, not dispensing with the former. Further,
as indicated supra Part II.A., there are significant historic deficiencies in the EPA’s
activity-oriented data. I am not suggesting that blame for flaws in such data should
be placed on performance-focused efforts. Nevertheless, resources to implement
and monitor new strategies may be siphoned from other activities. Deficiencies in
routine systems for measuring outcomes (e.g., compliance rates), coverage (e.g., inspection rates), activities (e.g., numbers of inspections), and resources (e.g., staff
time) obviously undermine efforts to understand trade-offs that are being made.
268
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Related to the challenges discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, in a study of the building industry in New Zealand,
Peter May noted that “[u]nder performance-based regulation,
the pendulum is clearly swinging away from tight controls and
toward increased discretion and flexibility,”270 and that “obtaining accountability [in a performance-based framework] for
results can be especially problematic.”271 His conclusion about
the implications of performance-based regulation for accountability was one of skepticism: “Accountability is a fundamental
and thorny issue for performance-based regulations and as such
is the Achilles’ heel of this form of regulation.”272 Mr. May concluded that the shift from relatively prescriptive regulation to
performance-based approaches led to the “systemic failure” of
the industry because, inter alia, it led to increased flexibility without sufficient accountability—a recipe, in his view, for deficient
performance and results.273
In short, while there is good reason to applaud the effort to
revisit and improve upon the EPA’s traditional enforcement
measures, there also is good reason to question whether new and
improved performance measures are likely in the short term to
fully ameliorate potential accountability concerns associated with
devolution and an expanded tool box.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have posited that there has been an ebb and flow in
the shape and operation of the administrative state over the past
twenty-five years or so in terms of its openness and accountability to the public.274 Theorists have offered different visions of
the regulatory state, including the role(s) that they anticipate
270

May, supra note 254, at 387.
Id. at 397.
272 Id. at 387. Mr. May endorsed Malcolm Sparrow’s statement that “[t]oo much
discretion creates opportunities for corruption and discrimination and opens a regulatory agency to capture by the regulated community.” Id. (citing SPARROW, supra
note 217, at 238). And he notes that “[t]he issue of accountability is closely related
to the traditional regulatory concern about potential for regulatory capture . . . the
issues of regulatory capture do not necessarily disappear under a performance-based
regulatory regime. They simply appear in more subtle forms.” Id. at 398. Mr. May’s
conclusion was that the movement to performance-based regulation for the building
industry in New Zealand produced “a form of global capture in that the public interest was not well served and the building industry gained . . . in the process by having
inexpensive construction methods.” Id.
273 Id. at 392-95.
274 See supra notes 2-17 and accompanying text.
271
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(and desire) different stakeholders playing in it.275 The details of
agency behavior obviously hold important insights for the merits
of different histories and theories. Such details provide guideposts for assessing the past, current, and possible future content
of the regulatory state and inform those who are inclined to pursue reforms.
The United States is said to be a worldwide trend-setter in fostering transparency in government and in maintaining a system
of governance that is accountable to its constituents. Other
countries and new forms of governance such as regional organizations are increasingly thought to be embracing reforms that
will move them in this direction. In recent years, United States
federal and state government officials have been vocal members
of this chorus of voices in favor of greater openness and accountability in government. The mantra of “open government” has
flowed easily from the lips of public officials as well as the more
obvious proponents of such governance in the “public interest”
community. And indeed, numerous steps have been taken to increase the openness of the administrative state, particularly in
the rulemaking realm. Based on this dialogue and activity, many
scholars believe that the United States is continuing to build on
past initiatives in order to still more increase transparency and
accountability.276
Intuitively, it may seem paradoxical to raise questions about
possible trends in government accountability and transparency,
given the current state of rhetoric and the recent advent of accountability-focused approaches throughout our government infrastructure (witness legislative products such as the GPRA and
administrative initiatives such as the EPA’s pursuit of more “results-oriented” measures of government performance).
But, as this Article points out, at least in the environmental
enforcement arena, several of the underlying features of government activity—including, notably, widespread devolution and the
significant expansion of the government’s “tool box”—have the
potential to cut the other way. These seemingly fundamental
features of governance have the potential to create substantial
“slack” and to reduce rather than increase openness and accountability in governance.
275

See supra note 20.
See, e.g., supra note 41. But see supra note 40 for the view that security and
other issues have engendered restrictions on openness and accountability.
276
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These essential elements of the architecture of the administrative state have important implications for the debate between
“civic skeptics” and “counter-reformationists.”277 They also have
implications for who is “right” among public choice, neopluralist,
civic republican and other theorists about the actual workings of
the state, and for the challenges that proponents of different versions of the administrative state face in making their preferred
vision a reality.278 Hopefully, this Article, by reviewing some of
the implications of central features of the administrative state,
notably devolution and expansion of approaches to governance
in the compliance arena, will contribute to these debates.

277
278

See supra notes 7-17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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